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INFORMATION COSTS AND REVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN 
THE COURTS AND THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES 
Brenna E. Jenny† 
Abstract 
Reverse payment settlements have attracted increased scrutiny 
due to the controversial presence of a payment from a brand-name 
drug company to a generic company that is ostensibly preparing to 
infringe on the branded company’s patent.  The antitrust agencies 
and the courts settled into an intergovernmental stalemate regarding 
the appropriate framework of analysis to apply when reviewing 
antitrust challenges to these settlements.  The FTC and DOJ have 
viewed the deals skeptically as a vehicle for competitors to split 
monopoly profits, but the lower courts have generally been 
deferential to what they identified as an exercise of a patent holder’s 
lawful right to exclude.  Much has been written about which side is 
correct, yet there has been relatively little exploration of the source of 
the persistent disagreement. 
Building off of Henry Smith’s property rights theory and the 
cognitive miser literature from Peter Lee, this Article explains that 
the long-standing disagreement stems from the judiciary’s application 
of information-cost-saving rules.  Courts adopted a formalistic 
approach that would almost invariably uphold a reverse payment 
settlement because they tend to apply bright-line rules when dealing 
with property rights, and they are prone to adjudicate complex patent 
and patent-related cases in ways that economize on the costs of 
information processing.  Although the Supreme Court resolved the 
disagreement by adopting a more information-demanding rule of 
reason approach in FTC v. Actavis, the cognitive miser phenomenon 
will continue to affect how courts adjudicate antitrust challenges to 
reverse-payment settlements. 
 
 †  Associate, Sidley Austin LLP; J.D., Harvard Law School; MPH, Harvard School of 
Public Health; A.B., Dartmouth College.  The author would like to thank Professors Ben Roin 
and Henry Smith for comments on earlier drafts and Professor Adam Mossoff and Robert Leider 
for their thoughtful input.  The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect those of Sidley Austin LLP and its partners.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a sharp public policy debate over 
the access to and the cost of prescription drugs.  Maximizing the use 
of generic drugs—which not only cost substantially less than their 
brand-name counterparts but also deflate the price of the branded 
versions as well
1—promises to be a critical component in the fight for 
an affordable price tag on healthcare.  When generic producers seek 
to enter the market before the expiration of the branded company’s 
patent, the patent holder has the opportunity to enforce its patent 
rights by filing suit for infringement.  The disagreement frequently 
ends in settlement, and a recent trend is for the settlement to contain 
an agreed-upon future entry date for the generic drug and a “reverse 
payment,” so named because it is a payment by the alleged victim, the 
patent holder, to the alleged patent violator.
2
  The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) labels such settlements “pay for delay” because it 
contends that these agreements represent strategic, collusive behavior 
between firms and reduce competition by generic manufacturers.
3
  
Others have defended reverse payment settlements as holding the 
potential for net procompetitive effects.
4
  Determining the appropriate 
level of antitrust scrutiny implicates a complex intersection between 
patent and antitrust law.  The topic has taken on even more 
significance since the Supreme Court’s recent holding in FTC v. 
Actavis, which requires courts to “strike [a] balance” between “patent 
and antitrust policies” by applying a rule of reason analysis to 
 
 1. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 9 (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-
expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf. 
 2. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why 
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse Payment Settlements of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 60 (2010). 
 3. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-
offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.  
See also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 
91-92 (“As long as monopoly profits are greater than joint duopoly profits, the monopolist and 
the entrant will have an incentive to negotiate in a way that leads to the monopoly level of 
output and the monopoly price.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 94-100 (arguing that reverse payment 
settlements can be either procompetitive or anticompetitive, depending on the context, and 
outlining six circumstances where reverse payment settlements may have procompetitive 
effects); Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 631, 647-56 (2007) (describing harms to competition and general welfare that would result 
from categorically prohibiting reverse payment settlements). 
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antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements.
5
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis follows years of legal 
challenges by both third-party payers and the FTC.  The FTC’s 
suspicions regarding the anticompetitive effects of reverse payment 
settlements propelled it into a union with the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), with both agencies ultimately 
advocating for the application of a “presumptively illegal” framework 
of analysis.  Although the Third Circuit recently did adopt such a test, 
over the past decade the vast majority of courts—citing the unique 
legal status of patents as lawful rights to exclude—have upheld 
reverse payment settlements under a deferential bright-line rule.  A 
gulf existed for years between the approaches of the FTC and DOJ 
(antitrust agencies) and the courts.  As a result, the Supreme Court in 
Actavis resolved not just an inter-circuit split, but an 
intergovernmental stalemate as well. 
Although the Supreme Court settled the dispute as a legal matter, 
it is still important to understand as a conceptual matter the 
underlying causes of the starkly different legal rules urged by the 
antitrust agencies on the one hand and actually adopted by the courts 
on the other, because the source of the disagreement will continue to 
impact how courts adjudicate challenges to reverse payment 
settlements.  Courts were subconsciously swayed toward adopting a 
deferential, bright-line rule for two reasons, both related to 
economizing information costs.  First, such a rule is consistent with 
the judiciary’s broader inclination to apply bright-line rules to 
disputes over property rights, such as patents.  Second, the judiciary’s 
decision to stick with their deferential bright-line rule in place of the 
agencies’ proposals is a reflection of the cognitive miser theory, 
which predicts the subconscious tendency of humans to apply bright-
line rules as a way of efficiently processing dense, complex 
information.  Professor Peter Lee has traced the influence of the 
cognitive miser phenomenon in the Federal Circuit’s general 
approach to adjudicating patent disputes.
6
  Building on his work, this 
Article illustrates that the cognitive miser phenomenon is not an 
isolated feature of patent infringement suits, but rather has played a 
substantial role in antitrust litigation involving patents.  Just as the 
cognitive miser theory explains the Federal Circuit’s penchant for 
formalism, so too does it contribute to the overwhelmingly rejection 
 
 5. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
 6. See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010). 
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by the lower courts of the antitrust agencies’ proposed frameworks in 
favor of a bright-line rule tending to uphold reverse payment 
settlements.
7
 
Part I introduces the cognitive miser phenomenon as an 
explanatory tool in the judiciary’s approach to patent law.  This 
section also discusses the judiciary’s more general propensity to apply 
bright-line rules when dealing with property rights.  The mental 
shortcuts associated with the cognitive miser phenomenon enable 
judges to economize on their own information costs when they 
adjudicate patent disputes; relatedly, when courts apply bright-line 
rules to property rights, they provide clear signposts as to the contours 
of these rights, which allows third parties to economize on 
information costs.  Both tendencies have played a substantial role in 
the courts’ overwhelming insistence on applying a permissive bright-
line rule, despite increasingly vocal insistence from the antitrust 
agencies that such an approach harms consumers. 
Part II provides an overview of the regulatory structure within 
which reverse payment settlements are formed.  Familiarity with this 
regime is critical to understanding both the incentives underlying the 
formation of reverse payment settlements, as well as the judiciary’s 
justification for its approach. 
Part III discusses the judiciary’s rejection of the FTC and DOJ’s 
initial proposals.  During these early years, both antitrust agencies 
settled on different versions of a rule of reason balancing test.  
Neither approach gained adherents among the federal courts.  The 
cognitive miser phenomenon predicts the courts’ rejection of these 
nuanced, intensive analyses in favor of a bright-line rule.  While the 
cognitive miser theory was a contributing factor during this phase, the 
rule of reason proposals faced an additional hurdle, in the form of the 
background tendency of courts to apply bright-line rules to disputes 
over property rights. 
Part IV analyzes the final evolution of the FTC and DOJ’s 
arguments and their continued lack of success in the courts.  This 
latest impasse was even more singularly driven by the cognitive miser 
phenomenon.  Since 2009, both the FTC and DOJ have coalesced 
around a legal framework that would deem reverse payment 
settlements presumptively illegal.  Despite the antitrust agencies’ 
 
 7. Lee explicitly distances himself from the idea that courts are intentionally 
sidestepping engagement with thorny patent law issues.  Id. at 28-29.  Likewise, the judicial 
enthusiasm for a deferential bright-line rule should be viewed as an unconscious manifestation 
of judges acting as cognitive misers. 
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unified support around a fairly bright-line alternative, courts, at least 
until Actavis, continued to provide reverse payment settlements with 
room to grow.  The cognitive miser phenomenon predicts the courts’ 
chosen path.  The rule that the courts selected not only entails less 
technological engagement than the antitrust agencies’ suggestions, but 
it preserves opportunities for private resolution of patent disputes, 
thereby preventing an influx of additional patent suits into federal 
court. 
Part V discusses the road forward in the wake of Actavis.  The 
Court acted in accord with its recent trend in the patent law context of 
replacing appellate court formalism with more flexible, but 
cognitively burdensome, multifactor tests.  Understanding how courts 
are particularly prone to applying information-cost-saving rules in 
patent-related cases will be useful because it offers clues as to how 
courts will apply rule of reason to these antitrust challenges. 
I. COURTS AND INFORMATION-COST-SAVING RULES 
Many scholars have criticized the Federal Circuit for being too 
formalistic in its adjudication and succumbing to an overreliance on 
bright-line rules.
8
  Recently the Supreme Court has echoed this 
criticism as well, striking down formalistic Federal Circuit rules in 
favor of more holistic standards.
9
  The significant cognitive burdens 
associated with the technological intricacies of patent litigation led 
Professor Peter Lee to hypothesize that the Federal Circuit’s turn to a 
rule-bound, formalist approach to adjudication is an expression of the 
cognitive miser theory.
10
 
This social psychology theory focuses on the natural tendency of 
humans to utilize mental shortcuts, such as presumptions and bright-
line rules, in areas of informational complexity in order to maximize 
 
 8. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of 
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1225 (2008); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme 
Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
1 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003). 
 9. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“Section 101 is a ‘dynamic 
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.’  A categorical rule denying 
patent protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate the 
purposes of the patent law.’” (citations omitted)); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
419 (2007) (“Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and 
when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness 
analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and 
motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content 
of issued patents.”). 
 10. Lee, supra note 6, at 26-27. 
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their inevitably bounded ability to comprehend new information.
11
  
As Lee explains, “In ‘systematic’ processing, individuals exert 
considerable cognitive effort to understand information inputs.  In 
‘heuristic’ processing, on the other hand, individuals rely on more 
easily accessible factors such as the identity of the information source 
or other ‘cues’ to reach conclusions.”12  Particularly in areas of 
uncertainty, such as where concepts are new and difficult to 
understand, we are all more likely to use heuristic processing to 
facilitate decision-making.
13
  Federal Circuit formalism—such as the 
“TSM” test, which asks judges to look to a finite number of 
categories for a fairly explicit indication of obviousness
14—correlates 
with “inquiry-truncating” rules that reduce technological 
engagement.
15
  Applying bright-line rules rather than standards limits 
the degree to which judges must grapple with, and comprehend, the 
ever-more-complex details of disputed technologies
16
 and nullifies 
some of the heavy information costs of wading through a patent 
dispute.
17
 
The cognitive miser theory has explanatory power beyond pure 
patent infringement suits or the Federal Circuit’s docket.  Patent law, 
as the rare intersection between law and science, presents unique 
challenges for judges who do not have scientific training.
18
  Indeed, 
judges have publicly acknowledged the difficulties presented by 
 
 11. Lee, supra note 6, at 25-29.  Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do 
Judges Maximize? (the Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in 
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 Emory L.J. 83 (2002) (arguing that judicial opinions in securities 
fraud cases “commonly rely on rules of thumb-decisionmaking heuristics” due to institutional 
constraints involving “limited cognitive capabilities, resource constraints, and a judicial desire to 
move cases off the docket in an acceptable fashion”). 
 12. Lee, supra note 6, at 21. 
 13. Id. at 22-23. 
 14. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) 
 15. Lee, supra note 6, at 33-41. 
 16. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1183 (2002) (describing how the Federal Circuit has applied “what are 
nominally the same legal rules” quite differently based on what industry the patent is situated 
within, which has caused district courts to similarly “apply[] the Federal Circuit rules in 
different ways depending on the technology at issue”). 
 17. See Lee, supra note 6, at 33-41. 
 18. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myraid Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2116 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (“I cannot stop 
without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it possible for a 
man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as 
these.  The inordinate expense of time is the least of the resulting evils . . . .”) (Hand, J.). 
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“judicial engagement with technology.”19  Drawing on studies 
showing that technological information places significant cognitive 
burdens on those without applicable background knowledge, Lee 
argues that when faced with the intricacies of patent disputes, judges 
outside of the Federal Circuit (who generally lack scientific training 
and significant patent litigation experience) are placed in a situation 
particularly conducive to the adoption of cognitive shortcuts.
20
  If our 
system’s experts unwittingly act as cognitive misers, then our 
system’s generalists are even more likely to do so.  Although forum 
selection has created a concentration of patent suits in certain district 
courts,
21
 patents remain a small percentage of any district court’s 
docket and the vast majority of patent cases are managed by district 
court judges who, on average, preside over one patent case per year.
22
  
Because appeals from district court decisions “arising under” patent 
law are the exclusive purview of the Federal Circuit,
23
 it is 
particularly rare for appellate judges to review patent-related claims.  
Therefore, most of the judges faced with challenges to reverse 
payment settlements are unaccustomed to patent law and its related 
legal issues.  Over the past decade, the cognitive miser phenomenon 
has significantly impacted the judiciary’s response to arguments from 
the antitrust agencies regarding when a reverse payment settlement 
should be struck down as anticompetitive.  Selecting bright-line rules 
to adjudicate cases in this immensely complex intersection of patent 
and antitrust law is consistent with judges engaging in heuristic 
processing. 
The Federal Circuit’s preference for bright-line rules in the 
context of patent disputes mirrors the judiciary’s more general 
tendency to apply formalistic rules when adjudicating property rights, 
although the two trends are driven by distinguishable motivations.  
Bright-line rules in property disputes also serve an information-cost-
saving function, but instead of allowing judges to cognitively 
economize, bright-line rules for property disputes primarily allow 
 
 19. See Lee, supra note 6, at 9-13 (2010) (collecting comments by members of the 
judiciary). 
 20. See id. at 23-25. 
 21. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J.  401, 405-07 tbl.2 
(2010). 
 22. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and 
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent 
Trial Court, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 393, 422-23 (2011). 
 23. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in 
Patent Law, MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 262 (2003). 
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third parties to economize, by clearly establishing the contours of a 
property holder’s rights.  As Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith have explained, property rights are “in rem—they bind ‘the rest 
of the world.’”24  In rem rights involve an identified owner of an 
identified resource, and they are generally protected by an exclusion 
regime in which the owner is given broad discretion to choose how he 
will use his resource, and others will be excluded from engaging in 
conflicting uses.
25
  The information costs related to the type of right 
affects how the right is governed: when the population of duty holders 
is large, simple rules are needed to “reduce[] the processing costs that 
would be high for such a large and anonymous audience.”26  An 
exclusion strategy uses “rough signals or informational variables” to 
“protect an indefinite class of uses with minimal precision.”27  Courts 
are freed from gathering information and then evaluating the 
reasonableness of an owner’s use of his property; owners are free to 
use their property without justifying their decisions to third parties.
28
  
In sum, the nature of property rights is conducive to administration 
through bright-line rules, because such rules allow the rest of the 
world to easily identify the contours of the property right at a low 
cost.
29
 
Smith contrasts in rem rights with in personam rights, which are 
obligations binding only certain identified people, such as those 
arising out of a contract between a few definite parties.
30
  In personam 
rights are typically delineated through a governance regime, which 
entails the use of more flexible rules to prescribe norms regarding 
permitted and restricted uses.
31
  Governance strategies will be used 
when it is cost-effective, from an information-cost perspective, to 
 
 24. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 773, 777 (2001). 
 25. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454 (2002) [hereinafter Exclusion Versus 
Governance].  See also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 978 (2004) (“On the dutyholder side, the message is a simple one—to ‘keep 
out’—and this simultaneously protects a reservoir of sues for the owner without officials or 
dutyholders needing to know what those might be.”) [hereinafter Nuisance]. 
 26. Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 25, at S455. 
 27. Nuisance, supra note 25, at 978. 
 28. Id. at 983. 
 29. Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 790.  One of the examples Merrill and Smith cite 
of a formalistic rule governing in rem rights is “the common law rule that the person in 
possession of a resource is presumed to have a property right.”  Id. at 803.  The presumption of 
validity in the patent context would serve a similar function. 
 30. Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 25, at S455. 
 31. Id. 
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place a larger informational burden on a few identified people.
32
  
Although property rights are generally governed by an exclusion 
regime, governance rules may be added in certain contexts to provide 
supplementary fine-tuning.
33
  One example is when courts evaluate 
land use in a nuisance suit.
34
  This shift from the exclusion side of the 
spectrum towards the governance end is more likely to occur as the 
value of the resource at issue rises, because the advantages of the 
additional precision provided by governance rules will outweigh their 
concomitantly weightier information costs.
35
 
It is well-established that patents are a type of property right,
36
 
but the property rights secured by patents are not considered 
coterminous with their real property counterparts.  For example, 
whether patents are property rights protected by the Takings Clause is 
an open question,
37
 and the majority approach is to view patents as 
entailing only the narrower right to exclude, versus the more 
expansive rights of use, possession, and disposition associated with 
real property.
38
  Nonetheless, scholars have noted that the conceptual 
framework associated with real property has influenced the treatment 
of patent rights.
39
  Even the Supreme Court has evoked the intuition 
that patents, like other property rights, should be clearly defined, 
remarking that, “[L]ike any property right, [a patent’s] boundaries 
should be clear. . . . [A] patent holder should know what he owns, and 
 
 32. Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 789-90. 
 33. Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 25, at S456. 
 34. Nuisance, supra note 25, at 985. 
 35. Id. at 989. 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. 261 (2006) (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”); 
see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) 
(characterizing the patent laws as securing “a property right”); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 
356, 358 (1881) (describing how a patent “confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in 
the patented invention”). 
 37. Compare Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that patents are not property protected by the Takings Clause), with Zoltek Corp. v. 
United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“The en banc court’s 
action is also particularly striking insofar as it vacates the earlier Zoltek decision that the United 
States is not liable on a takings theory.”).  See generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as 
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings 
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2008) (arguing that the Takings Clause applies to patents). 
 38. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 4 (3d ed. 2004); but see 
generally Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
321, 374 (2009) (criticizing the “exclusion concept of patents” based on “the more substantive 
conceptual content of nineteenth-century patent doctrines”). 
 39. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-903 (1997) (book review); Mossoff, supra note 38, at 370-75. 
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the public should know what he does not.”40  The real property-patent 
relationship is an example of Professor Adam Mossoff’s more general 
observation that the “content of a legal entitlement creates a 
conceptual framework within which courts craft legal doctrines to 
secure the various elements of this entitlement.”41  This insight 
predicts that courts will apply bright-line rules when analyzing 
reverse payment settlements—regardless of the cognitive challenges 
of patent litigation—because these disputes involve a type of right 
that courts view as conducive to solution by bright-line rules. 
This Part has described the two conceptual factors that entice 
courts to use a bright-line rule when confronted with antitrust 
challenges to reverse payment settlements.  As Parts III and IV will 
describe, these two factors alternately played different roles based on 
whether the agencies were proposing multifactor balancing tests or 
competing versions of bright-line rules.  Before proceeding to this 
analysis, it is important to provide an overview of the regulatory 
framework that has influenced the creation of reverse payment 
settlements. 
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
Reverse payment settlements are created in the shadow of a very 
particular regulatory scheme designed not only to guarantee safe 
drugs, but also to incentivize their creation in the first place, by 
ensuring that intellectual property rights do not stifle competition.
42
  
Indeed many courts and even the DOJ have characterized reverse 
payment settlements as a direct result of the incentives created by the 
regulatory regime for drug approvals.
43
  Familiarity with this 
regulatory environment is important for understanding the incentives 
of branded and generic companies when they challenge a patent or 
enter into a settlement terminating such a dispute. 
Companies that wish to market a new drug must submit a New 
Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA and receive approval to market 
the product to the general public.
44
  NDAs reflect the results of 
 
 40. Festo, 535 U.S. at 731.  See also Mossoff, supra note 38, at 694-95 (describing how 
the Festo Court applied concepts and terminology drawn from real property takings doctrine to 
the patent infringement case before it). 
 41. Mossoff, supra note 38, at 374. 
 42. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 4, at 638. 
 43. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206-07; Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, In re 
Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830). 
 44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2010). 
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clinical studies and must indicate that the drug is safe and effective 
for use.
45
  The NDA process does not confer patent protection, and 
manufacturers must separately navigate the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) application process.  Patent 
information is listed in the FDA’s Orange Book, along with other 
details about a drug such as active ingredients.
46
 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (Hatch-Waxman), controls the 
process by which generic drugs enter the market.
47
  A generic 
manufacturer is required to submit an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA), which encompasses a far less rigorous 
application process as compared to an NDA because while the 
product must exhibit bioequivalence to its branded counterpart, it 
need not go through the same regimen of clinical trials.
48
  As part of 
the ANDA, the generic manufacturer must also certify that the patent 
protection on the generic’s brand-name equivalent does not prohibit 
production of the generic.
49
 
Reverse payment settlements are generally preceded by a generic 
manufacturer’s submission of a “paragraph IV certification”50 
claiming either that the branded manufacturer’s patent is invalid or 
the generic product differs from the brand-name equivalent in such a 
way as to avoid infringing on the patent.
51
  After the generic submits a 
paragraph IV certification, the holder of the patent at issue is 
notified.
52
  If the branded manufacturer files suit within forty-five 
days of notification, then the FDA must initiate a thirty-month stay on 
approval of the generic product.
53
  This thirty-month stay provides the 
branded manufacturer with a significant incentive to sue the 
paragraph IV filer, regardless of the confidence it has in its case. 
 
 45. Id. § 355(b)(1). 
 46. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (33d ed., 2013). 
 47. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 15, 21, 28, 
and 35). 
 48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).  See also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CENTER FOR DRUG 
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, SUBMISSION OF SUMMARY BIOEQUIVALENCE DATA FOR ANDAS 
(2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/UCM134846.pdf. 
 49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2010). 
 50. So named for its location in paragraph IV of Title 21.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) 
(2010). 
 51. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 52. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B). 
 53. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  The stay can end before thirty months have passed if a court 
rules that the patent is either invalid or not infringed.  Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). 
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Generic companies, too, have a significant incentive to file 
paragraph IV certifications in the first place.  In order to expedite the 
entry of generic products, Hatch-Waxman motivates generic 
manufacturers to make paragraph IV certifications by giving the first 
filer a 180-day period of exclusivity.
54
  During this time period, other 
generic products cannot compete on the market because the FDA is 
prohibited from approving their ANDAs.
55
  The 180-day period 
begins to run when the paragraph IV filer initiates “commercial 
marketing” of the drug.56  As some courts and commentators have 
noted, inviting generic producers to challenge patents has created an 
environment in which branded companies bear nearly all of the 
potential downside to litigating, while generic companies enjoy nearly 
all of the potential upside: 
[U]nder the Hatch-Waxman Act, the patent holder ordinarily 
brings suit shortly after the paragraph IV ANDA has been filed—
before the filer has spent substantial sums on the manufacturing, 
marketing, or distribution of the potentially infringing generic 
drug.  The prospective generic manufacturer therefore has 
relatively little to lose in litigation precipitated by a paragraph IV 
certification beyond litigation costs and the opportunity for future 
profits from selling the generic drug.  Conversely, there are no 
infringement damages for the patent holder to recover, and there is 
therefore little reason for it to pursue the litigation beyond the 
point at which it can assure itself that no infringement will occur in 
the first place.  Accordingly, a generic marketer has few 
disincentives to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification.  
The incentive, by contrast, may be immense: the profits it will 
likely garner in competing with the patent holder without having 
invested substantially in the development of the drug, and, in 
addition, possible entitlement to a 180-day period . . . during which 
it would be the exclusive seller of the generic drug in the market.  
 
 54. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  See also Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 1, at 7, 57 (“The 
180-day exclusivity period thus increases the economic incentives for a generic company to be 
the first to file an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification. Through this 180-day 
provision, the Amendments also provide an incentive for generic companies to litigate patents 
that may be invalid and to ‘design around’ patents to find alternative, non-infringing forms of 
patented drugs.”).  If multiple companies file on the same initial day, all will enter the market 
together for 180 days.  FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY 
EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY 4 (July 2003), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/u
cm072851.pdf. 
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2010). 
 56. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). 
JENNY  4/2/2014  11:01 PM 
244 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 30 
The patent holder’s risk if it loses the resulting patent suit is 
correspondingly large: It will be stripped of its patent monopoly.  
At the same time, it stands to gain little from winning other than 
the continued protection of its lawful monopoly over the 
manufacture and sale of the drug in question.
57
 
As such, branded companies do face significant incentives to settle 
and avoid final judgment in a lawsuit that challenges their patent. 
Hatch-Waxman was initially susceptible to manipulation if a 
generic manufacturer holding the right to a 180-day exclusivity period 
delayed the start of its commercial marketing.  The FDA was still 
prohibited from approving ANDAs for analogous generic products 
until the end of the 180-day period, but by failing to initiate 
commercial marketing, the first filer prevented the clock from 
beginning to tick.  A “bottleneck” was created: by not acting on its 
exclusivity period, the first filer could block all other generic 
producers who filed behind it from entering the market.
58
  The 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003 (Medicare Modernization Act) amended Hatch-Waxman to 
prevent the creation of bottlenecks.
 59
  The first paragraph IV filer 
must market the drug within seventy-five days of FDA approval of its 
application or within thirty months of filing, whichever occurs 
sooner.
60
  Both of these deadlines are termed “forfeiture events,” and 
if the first filer does not market its drug in time, it loses the 180-day 
exclusivity period.
61
  While this modification has the salutary benefit 
of avoiding the bottleneck issue, the exclusivity period evaporates 
forever: if the first filer triggers a forfeiture event, none of the 
subsequent generic filers are eligible for the 180-day exclusivity 
period.
62
  The availability of the exclusivity to only the first filer, and 
 
 57. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2006).  See 
also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2005) (calling the 
Commission’s insistence that the parties could have settled, sans reverse payment, on an earlier 
entry date a “myopic” proposition); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. 
Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); William J. Newsom, Exceeding the Scope of the Patent: 
Solving the Reverse Payment Settlement Problem Through Antitrust Enforcement and 
Regulatory Reform, 1 HASTINGS SCI. AND TECH. L.J. 201, 227-29 (2009). 
 58. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 1, at viii; Prepared Statement of the Federal 
Trade Commission: Hearing on Barriers to Generic Entry Before the Special Committee on 
Aging, 20-21 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2010). 
 61. Id. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)-(ii). 
 62. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii). 
JENNY 4/2/2014  11:01 PM 
2014] INFO. COSTS & REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 245 
not the first generic entrant, has implications for the impact of reverse 
payment settlements on generic entry.  If a brand-name manufacturer 
and a generic entrant form a reverse payment settlement, the timing of 
the resulting arrangement tends to create a forfeiture event.  Although 
other generic companies can subsequently file paragraph IV 
certifications and challenge the patent, the incentives for doing so are 
significantly lower without the later reward of exclusivity.
63
 
Because Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory structure was intended to 
incentivize generic entry, the FTC is particularly attuned to 
allegations that companies are manipulating Hatch-Waxman to 
minimize or delay entry of generic products.  FTC investigations of 
settlements between brand and generic manufacturers first became 
public in 1999, and the Agency released its first major study on the 
issue in 2002.
64
  The study examined settlements between 
pharmaceutical companies since 1992 and concluded that of the 
twenty final settlements related to ANDA litigation, nine involved 
payment from the branded manufacturer to the generic.
65
  Bothered by 
this trend, the FTC study requested legislation that would require 
brand and generic manufacturers to submit copies of their settlement 
agreements to the FTC.
66
  This request was granted in 2003 as part of 
the Medicare Modernization Act, and the FTC began compiling 
annual summaries of reverse payment settlements.
67
 
Reverse payment settlements have occurred with increasing 
frequency over the past decade, and FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz has 
described them as “almost an epidemic.”68  Between 2004 and 2009, 
sixty-six settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical 
 
 63. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 131-32 (2006) (arguing reverse payment settlements 
remove the “most vigorous competitor” from the field, leaving only less motivated subsequent 
filers to challenge the patent).  The majority and dissent in Actavis sparred over the extent to 
which these incentives are truly lowered so significantly that a generic without an opportunity to 
obtain the 180-day exclusivity period would lack sufficient incentive to file a paragraph IV 
certification and attempt to enter the market prior to the patent’s expiration.  Compare id. at 
2246 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) with FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235 (2013). 
 64. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 1, at vii-viii. 
 65. Id. at 31. 
 66. Id. at vi. 
 67. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, SUMMARY OF 
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-
commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf. 
 68. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Testimony: Stopping “Pay-for-Delay” Drug 
Settlement Agreements is a Top Competition Priority (July 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07/antitrust.shtm (on file with author). 
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companies involved a payment from the branded company and an 
agreement by the generic to forego entry until some date in the 
future.
69
  During this time period, the settlements occurred with 
rapidly increasing frequency—in 2004, there were zero, and by 2009, 
there were nineteen.
70
  Each of the next two years featured roughly 
thirty reverse payment settlements.
71
  The FTC recently calculated 
that each reverse payment settlement delays entry of generic 
competitors in the patent holder’s relevant market for an average of 
seventeen months, with a cumulative resulting cost of $35 billion to 
American consumers over the next ten years.
72
 
This Part has explained how the detailed regulatory regime of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act forms a backdrop for the antitrust-patent disputes 
before the courts.  Regardless of whether Hatch-Waxman created 
unforeseen incentives for patent litigants to enter into reverse 
payment settlements, such adversaries turned co-defendants 
undeniably possess unique incentives to do so.  The complexity of the 
resulting antitrust-patent intersection also provides insight on the 
attractiveness of cognitive shortcuts in this context. 
III. THE EARLY YEARS: STRUGGLING TO FIND A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Citing the rising incidence of reverse payment settlements, the 
FTC initially sought to have them banned under a per se illegal rule.  
The FTC soon abandoned this position when even some of its own 
members acknowledged that the harsh bluntness of this rule was ill-
suited to the complexity of reverse payment settlements.  In its place, 
the FTC advocated a more flexible rule of reason inquiry.  The courts 
rebuffed this approach as well.  Rejection of a rule of reason standard 
is directly consistent with the cognitive miser phenomenon.  An 
 
 69. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 1. 
 70. Id. 
 71. FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED 
IN FY 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-
commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-modernization/1110mmaagree-
2.pdf. 
 72. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 2.  But see BRET DICKEY, JONATHON ORSZAG, 
& ROBERT WILLIG, A PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF 
PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON “REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS” (2010), available at 
http://compass-lexecon.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/cms-
documents/f72bfed6f1de5f73/Dickey_Orszag_Willig_CBO.pdf (disputing the reliability of the 
FTC’s calculations in its 2010 study); see also Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent 
Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 307-08 (2011) (explaining why prohibiting 
settlements may not necessarily result in lower drug prices). 
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additional force was also at work during this time period, namely the 
fundamental mismatch between the rule of reason and the type of 
rules traditionally used in the adjudication of property disputes. 
A. The Rise and Fall of a Per Se Illegal Rule 
The Sixth Circuit was the first appellate court to reach the merits 
of an antitrust challenge to a reverse payment settlement, and it struck 
down the settlement as per se illegal.
73
  The case, In re Cardizem, was 
a suit brought by third-party drug purchasers, and it challenged an 
interim settlement that included a reverse payment.
74
  Among other 
terms of the deal, the generic company—who had been the first to 
file—promised not to relinquish or transfer its 180-day period of 
exclusivity, ensuring (under the pre-Medicare Modernization Act 
regime) that a bottleneck would be created.
75
  Even though the 
statutory thirty-month stay ended before the resolution of the 
litigation and the generic company’s product had received FDA 
approval, the generic did not bring the drug to market.
76
  The crux of 
the plaintiffs’ claim was that, but for the payments from the branded 
to the generic company, the latter would have introduced its product 
much sooner.
77
  The district court held that the agreement was per se 
illegal as a horizontal market division, and the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.
78
 
The FTC was not involved with In re Cardizem, but it did 
endeavor to broaden the adoption of the per se illegal rule.  Shortly 
after the In re Cardizem district court decision, the FTC brought a 
complaint against Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering) and two 
 
 73. Two years before this case, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did review a challenge 
to the same reverse payment settlement, but only in the context of standing to challenge the 
settlement.  See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 807-10 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
 74. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 75. See id. at 902. 
 76. Id. at 903. 
 77. Id. at 904. 
 78. Id. at 905-07.  Categories of restraints of trade that always or almost always have 
anticompetitive effects will be deemed “per se” illegal.  Regardless of any competitive 
justifications, courts will assume they are an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act.  “As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had 
considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with 
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.” 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 (2007) (citation 
omitted). 
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would-be generic producers of a Schering product called K-Dur.
79
  
Although the FTC urged an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to 
follow the district court’s decision in In re Cardizem and label the 
settlement a per se illegal market division, the ALJ insisted that a per 
se framework of analysis was inappropriate.
80
  Reverse payment 
settlements were then still a “novelty,” and the economic impact was 
not “immediately obvious,” rendering rule of reason the superior 
approach.
81
 
Under the ALJ’s rule of reason framework,82 the FTC was 
required to first prove that the settlements had an anticompetitive 
effect.
83
  Because the agreements allowed both generic producers to 
sell their drugs prior to the expiration of Schering’s patent, the ALJ 
determined that the FTC could only meet its burden of proof by 
showing that, absent the settlement terms, these generics would have 
entered the market earlier than the terms of the settlement allowed.
84
  
The FTC admitted that there was no proof an earlier entry date would 
have occurred, and the ALJ upheld the settlement based on the FTC’s 
failure to prove anticompetitive effects.
85
 
The FTC’s complaint counsel appealed the ALJ’s adverse 
 
 79. Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs., & Am. Home Prods. Corp., 2002 WL 
1488085, at *1 (F.T.C. June 27, 2002). 
 80. Id. at *83. 
 81. Id. at *84-85.  The ALJ also found In re Cardizem to be not particularly persuasive 
caselaw because they involved interim agreements, unlike the final settlements in Schering-
Plough which ended the dispute between parties, allowing them to reap the oft-cited benefits of 
settlement, such as avoiding the cost and uncertainty of protracted litigation.  See id. at *84. 
 82. A rule of reason inquiry is a case-by-case analysis of whether a particular restraint of 
trade is unreasonable.  “Courts today apply a ‘burden-shifting’ approach in applying full-blown 
rule-of-reason analysis: (1) the plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove that the agreement had 
anticompetitive effects; (2) if it does, the burden of going forward shifts to the defendants to 
establish procompetitive justifications for the agreement; and (3) if the defendants sustain their 
burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the anticompetitive effects of the 
agreement outweigh its procompetitive effects or that the procompetitive effects could have 
been achieved in a less anticompetitive manner.”  JOHN J. MILES, 1 HEALTH CARE AND 
ANTITRUST L. § 2A:11 (2013). 
 83. Schering-Plough Corp., 2002 WL 1488085, at *88. 
 84. Id. at *89-90. 
 85. Id. at *90, 98.  Even though the two generic versions at issue had received final FDA 
approval in November 1998 and June 1999, the ALJ found “no credible evidence” either 
manufacturer would have sold their products while still engaged in patent litigation: were they 
to later lose the case, these sales would subject the companies to the potentially “dire 
consequences” of paying damages based on the sales of their infringing generic.  Id. at *92.  But 
see Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“We also 
reject [the generic company’s] argument that any rational actor like itself would not market its 
generic drug until the patent infringement suit against it was resolved . . . . A reasonable juror 
could conclude that . . . but for the agreement, [the generic] would have entered the market.”). 
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decision to the Federal Trade Commission sitting as an appellate body 
(Commission).
86
  Although the FTC’s complaint counsel continued to 
urge adoption of a per se illegal rule, the Commission agreed with the 
ALJ that rule of reason was the proper approach.
87
  The Commission 
disagreed, however, with the ALJ’s particular method of analyzing 
anticompetitive effects within the rule of reason.
88
  The ALJ had 
implied that, absent a court decision on the merits in the underlying 
patent litigation, there was no way to discern with sufficient certainty 
whether the settlement payments prevented an otherwise earlier 
generic entry from occurring—in other words, whether the settlement 
had anticompetitive effects.
89
  The Commission advanced a litany of 
reasons for why it was neither necessary nor practical to look at the 
merits of the underlying patent litigation when weighing the 
anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment settlement.
90
  Primarily, 
the Commission was concerned that this type of ex post inquiry was 
“unreliable” and risked a chilling effect on future settlements.91 
The Commission instead wanted the focus to be on the generic 
entry date that would have prevailed in “a differently crafted 
settlement” between the parties, namely one without a reverse 
payment.
92
  When parties select a future generic entry date in 
isolation, without any money changing hands, the Commission 
viewed this date as reflecting the parties’ estimations of the strength 
 
 86. The FTC holds a unique role as both prosecutor and judge.  After the FTC brings a 
complaint to its own ALJ, complaint counsel for the FTC may appeal the initial decision of the 
ALJ back to the Commission.  See 24 AM. JUR. Defending Antitrust Lawsuits § 16 (1977). 
 87. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 971-72 (2003). 
 88. Id. at 964-65, 992. 
 89. Id.  The respondent drug companies had also argued that “proof of anticompetitive 
effects requires proof on the merits of the underlying patent claims.” Id. at 992. 
 90. Id. at 969, 998.  When the Supreme Court in Actavis mandated application of the rule 
of reason, it was notably more sanguine about the role of a mini patent trial, explaining that it 
would not “require the courts to insist . . . that the [FTC] need[s] to litigate the patent’s validity,” 
but leaving open the possibility that some courts may wish to engage in this analysis when 
applying rule of reason.  See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237-38 (2013).  But see Sumanth 
Addanki & Alan J. Daskin, Patent Settlement Agreements, in 3 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 2127, 2131 (2008).  Addanki and Daskin argue 
that evaluation of the anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment settlement “must consider the 
likely outcomes under litigation,” but that such an inquiry into the underlying patent litigation 
would be significantly less burdensome than a full trial, because a court need only determine 
whether the entry date was later than the expected time of entry resulting from litigation.  Id.  
For example, if a settlement split the remaining patent period in half—allowing generic entry at 
the midway point of the remaining period of patent protection—then a court need only 
determine whether the patentholder was less than fifty percent likely to have prevailed at trial. 
 91. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 997-98. 
 92. Id. at 994. 
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of their own case.
93
  In contrast, an agreement on a future entry date 
combined with a payment from the patent holder to the generic 
indicates “there must have been some offsetting consideration.”94  
Unless there was some additional consideration given to the branded 
manufacturer, “it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the 
payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the 
date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.”95  
Complaint counsel for the FTC conceded that if it failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the reverse payment “exceeded, 
by a substantial amount,” the branded company’s reasonable 
estimation of the value of the consideration received from the generic, 
then the FTC would have failed to prove anticompetitive effects.
96
 
During its appellate review, the Commission has the power to 
make additional findings of fact,
97
 and the Commission found that the 
amount of money Schering gave to the generic companies was 
unreasonably high in light of the consideration supposedly received 
by Schering.
98
  This created a prima facie case of anticompetitive 
effects, shifting the burden to the respondent companies to establish 
the settlement’s offsetting procompetitive effects.99  The Commission 
found that the settlements failed a rule of reason inquiry because the 
companies could do no more than “suggest hypothetical benefits.”100  
After the Commission refused to apply a per se illegal rule, the FTC 
halted its efforts to spread the Sixth Circuit’s rule.101  Courts, too, 
began adopting a new approach. 
Although this bright-line rule is certainly consistent with the type 
of rule courts typically apply to property rights, its simplicity makes 
 
 93. Id. at 987.  But see Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement 
Puzzle, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 283, 313-22 (2012) (arguing that even settlements with a 
predetermined future entry date but no reverse payment are more likely than not 
anticompetitive). 
 94. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 988. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1004. 
 97. AM. JUR. supra note 86.  Appellate review of this fact-finding is performed under the 
traditional deferential standard of review.  See FTC v. Ind. Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 
454 (1986) (“[A reviewing] court must accept the Commission’s findings of fact if they are 
supported by ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.’”). 
 98. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 1002-04, 1053. 
 99. See id. at 988, 1002. 
 100. Id. at 999, 1002. 
 101. See Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 37-38, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 
1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (abandoning its previous emphasis on the propriety of a per se standard 
and explaining it would work within a rule of reason framework). 
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its unpopularity seem inconsistent with the cognitive miser 
phenomenon.  Yet even as the Commission viewed reverse payment 
settlements with skepticism, it recognized that their potential 
procompetitive effects rendered them ill-suited for per se illegal 
treatment.
102
  As the Supreme Court has explained, “the per se rule is 
appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with 
the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with 
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances 
under the rule of reason.”103  The antitrust agencies have since 
acknowledged that the categorical harshness of a per se illegal rule is 
not appropriate in this context.
104
  The cognitive miser phenomenon 
predicts the adoption of heuristics and mental shortcuts; it does not 
predict the adoption of modes of analysis recognized as inapplicable.  
Furthermore, the judicial rejection of the per se illegal rule has been 
in favor of an almost equally bright-line rule, the choice of which, as 
will be discussed below, can largely be explained by the cognitive 
miser phenomenon. 
B. Courts Reject Rule of Reason in Favor of (Almost) Per Se 
Legal 
After the per se illegal rule lost steam, the FTC began to work to 
convince courts to adopt an approach similar to the rule of reason 
analysis that the Commission had applied in Schering-Plough.  The 
FTC’s rule of reason framework was premised on a view of patent 
protection as “probabilistic”: a patent-holder’s ability to exclude 
others is not absolute; rather, the ability to exclude is a function of the 
odds that the patent holder can successfully invoke the patent to 
exclude competitors.
105
  In other words, the expected length of patent 
protection must be discounted by the possibility that it cannot be 
successfully wielded by the holder to fend off challengers.
106
  The 
 
 102. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 971-72. 
 103. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 104. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the American 
Conference Institute’s Paragraph IV Disputes Conference (Dec. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/111207paragraphIV.pdf; Brief for the United States in 
Response to the Court’s Invitation at 19-20, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. 
Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-2851-cv(L)). 
 105. See Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 101, at 41-42. 
 106. The view of patent protection as “probabilistic” has sparked contentious debate.  
Some commentators agree with the FTC.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, supra note 
3, at 75; Keith Leffler & Christofer Leffler, Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response 
to Kevin McDonald, 17 ANTITRUST 77 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent 
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implication of this conception of patents was the type of “what if” 
estimation articulated in the Commission’s decision: the amount of 
competition achieved by the settlement—the time until generic entry 
to market—must be compared with the amount of competition that 
“would have been expected absent the payments.”107  This latter level 
of competition would be reflected in the parties’ “collectively 
expected outcome of litigation,” namely the entry date that would 
have been selected in a settlement without a reverse payment (or the 
“hypothetical no-payment compromise on the entry date”).108  Under 
this logic, payment from a branded company is to purchase delay and 
push the entry date back, beyond the date the parties would have 
selected in a hypothetical settlement without a reverse payment.  
However, the FTC still bore the burden of proof to show a “direct 
causal link” between the entry date and the payments; generally, this 
would be established by showing that the branded company had 
received inadequate consideration in exchange for its payments.
109
 
The FTC’s rule of reason approach was still out of sync with the 
judiciary.  Courts continued to select a bright-line rule, but now a rule 
of near per se legality was quickly gaining converts.  In 2003—the 
same year that the Sixth Circuit decided In re Cardizem—the 
Eleventh Circuit was faced with a challenge to a pair of reverse 
payment settlements between Abbott and two generic companies.
110
  
Three years earlier the district court had published an opinion 
mirroring the In re Cardizem district court in finding the settlements 
to be per se illegal market divisions.
111
  In Valley Drug the Eleventh 
 
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003) (characterizing patents as a “bundle of uncertain 
and imperfect rights”).  Others have criticized this view as contradicting the treatment courts 
normally accord patents.  See, e.g., Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 101 & n.235 (“Rights are 
traditionally found when enforceable, but [the probabilistic patent view] argues that whatever 
right a patent grants does not reach full strength until actually enforced.”); Marc G. Schildkraut, 
Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1049-
52 (2004); Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Settlements and Antitrust: on “Probabilistic” 
Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 68.  Courts have consistently 
refused to view patent protection as “probabilistic.”  See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 
F.3d 1298, 1312-14 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 
F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  However the Court in Actavis implicitly accepted the theory.  
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (explaining that a payment “likely 
seek[ing] to prevent the risk of competition” is itself “the relevant anticompetitive harm”). 
 107. Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 101, at 42-43. 
 108. Id. at 44. 
 109. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir. 2005).  See also 
Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1003-04 (2003). 
 110. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 111. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 
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Circuit rejected the lower court’s per se illegal treatment and 
pioneered a new approach.
112
 
Because patents give their owners a lawful right to exclude 
others, the court explained that competitors’ horizontal agreement to 
divide a market did not necessarily create an antitrust violation.
113
  
This was particularly true because patent disputes operate in an 
environment with a pre-existing anticompetitive restraint.
114
  The 
judicial inquiry must instead revolve around the “exclusionary power” 
of the patent.
115
  Even if a patent has been ruled invalid, its 
exclusionary power must nonetheless be analyzed, because the 
reasonableness of the agreement should be judged from the ex ante 
perspective of the parties.
116
  The court expressed concern that 
threatening settling parties with antitrust liability if the branded 
company subsequently loses the patent suit would discourage 
settlement, particularly given the significant uncertainty inherent in 
the complexity of patent litigation.
117
  Although the Valley Drug court 
conceded that reverse payments may indicate the patent holder’s lack 
of confidence in the validity of its patent, “the asymmetries of risk 
and large profits at stake” mitigated the potential strength of such an 
assumption.
118
  Two years after Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit had 
an opportunity to revisit the treatment of reverse payment settlements 
when the Schering-Plough respondents appealed the Commission’s 
decision.  In Schering-Plough the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its initial 
approach, distilling a three-part test for antitrust liability from Valley 
Drug: courts faced with a contested reverse payment settlement must 
examine “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) 
the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the 
resulting anticompetitive effects.”119 
The Eleventh Circuit was silent as to what determines the scope 
 
2000) rev’d sub nom., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 112. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1309. 
 113. Id. at 1305.  Nor did the court agree that rule of reason is appropriate.  See id. at 1311 
n.27. 
 114. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066. 
 115. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306. 
 116. Id. at 1306-07. 
 117. Id. at 1308.  See generally James Farrand et. al., “Reform” Arrives in Patent 
Enforcement: The Big Picture, 51 IDEA 357 (2011). 
 118. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1309-10.  See also supra Part II. 
 119. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312).  
The court found that the agreements did not exceed the scope of this protection, because the 
Commission had inappropriately discounted the ALJ’s findings of fact that the consideration 
Schering received in exchange for its payments was in fact reasonable.  Id. at 1070-72. 
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of a patent’s “exclusionary potential.”  The FTC initially interpreted 
this test as allowing reverse payment settlements to be virtually per se 
lawful so long as the parties agreed on a generic entry occurring no 
later than the date of the patent’s expiration.120  The Second Circuit 
effectively adopted this interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decisions—and then applied such a test—when it faced its first 
reverse payment settlement case in In re Tamoxifen.
121
  Citing 
Schering-Plough, the Second Circuit explained that the unique 
environment of patent protection rendered agreements valid if they 
did not “exceed the ‘scope of the patent’s protection.’”122  The Second 
Circuit’s test is known as the “sham litigation” rule:123 “so long as the 
patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent 
holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to 
which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the 
manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”124 
Once a court finds that the underlying patent suit is not facially 
frivolous, the settlement will be upheld so long as it does not “extend 
the reach” of the patent.125  For the In re Tamoxifen court, this inquiry 
involved the review of a few easy-to-determine factors.  The court 
noted that the agreement did not forbid the generic company from 
marketing products unrelated to the one at issue in the patent 
litigation, there was no bottleneck created,
126
 and just eight months 
after the settlement became effective, the generic would be able to sell 
a version of the branded drug under license from the patent holder.
127
  
The Second Circuit agreed with the Schering-Plough panel that 
Hatch-Waxman’s structure “encourages” reverse payment settlements 
 
 120. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688). 
 121. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 122. Id. (quoting Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 123. See, e.g., Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae at 19, Schering-Plough v. FTC, 
402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688). 
 124. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208-09. 
 125. Id. at 213. 
 126. The settlement required the first generic filer to amend its ANDA and remove its 
paragraph IV certification, enabling the FDA to approve subsequently filed ANDAs.  Id. at 214.  
However, the In re Tamoxifen panel was under the erroneous impression that other generic 
manufacturers were not only free, in the absence of a bottleneck, to challenge the patent, but 
would be incentivized to do so based on “potentially securing the 180-day exclusivity period 
available upon a victory in a subsequent infringement suit lawsuit.”  Id.  As discussed earlier, 
the 180-day exclusivity period is available only to the first filer, not the first successful 
challenger. 
 127. Id. at 213-16. 
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as a way to “insure against” loss.128  Furthermore, even if the 
underlying patent was weak and the holder was likely to lose its suit, 
the court explained that the statutory presumption of a patent’s 
validity meant that “settlement is merely an extension of the valid 
patent monopoly.”129 
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit had another 
opportunity to revisit its posture toward reverse payment settlements.  
However, unlike the Schering-Plough court, this subsequent panel 
was not so sanguine about the wisdom of its initial decision.  The 
Second Circuit’s opinion in Arkansas Carpenters was a brief one.  
The panel explained that In re Tamoxifen compelled the conclusion 
that the agreement at bar did not exceed the scope of the patent and 
therefore was not an antitrust violation.
130
  Although the court 
delineated multiple reasons why it might be willing to revisit its 
approach, and the FTC submitted an amicus brief in support of a 
rehearing,
131
 the Second Circuit ultimately refused to reconsider en 
banc.
132
 
In between the Second Circuit’s decisions in In re Tamoxifen and 
Arkansas Carpenters, the Federal Circuit also adopted the sham 
litigation rule, in a case known as In re Cipro.
133
  The In re Cipro 
plaintiffs had advanced the FTC’s probabilistic patent protection 
 
 128. Id. at 206, 210. 
 129. Id. at 211. 
 130. Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 
2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).  Although the In re Tamoxifen panel 
erroneously believed that a second-in-time generic filer could still obtain the 180-day 
exclusivity period, the Arkansas Carpenter court did not refer to this potential reward as being 
available to subsequent filers.  Yet the court still acknowledged that under the sham litigation 
test, the companies had not “manipulate[ed] . . . the exclusivity period.”  Id. at 107.  This implies 
that, at least in the Second Circuit, unlawful manipulation of the exclusivity period will be found 
only if a bottleneck is formed, but not if the creation of a settlement erases the existence of a 
180-day exclusivity period.  The court’s focus, then, is on whether generic companies are 
permitted, under the regulatory scheme, to challenge a patent, and not on whether their 
incentives have been so diminished by the loss of the exclusivity bounty that they realistically 
may never attempt to challenge.  Cf. Hemphill, supra note 63, at 126-42 (arguing that 
“[p]roblematic settlements are feasible even where there is no formal bottleneck to FDA 
approval, because buying off the single firm with bounty eligibility carries a strong prospect of 
allocative harm.”). 
 131. Brief Amicus Curiae of Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Rehearing En Banc, 
Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-
2851-cv(L)). 
 132. Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 
2010).  Judge Pooler, a member of the Arkansas Carpenters panel, wrote an impassioned dissent 
urging Congress or the Supreme Court to step in.  Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting) 
 133. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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theory, but the district court refused to “discount the exclusionary 
power of the patent by any probability that the patent would have 
been invalid.”134  Similarly, the Federal Circuit explained it was 
following the Second and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that absent 
“evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation,” a court need 
not consider the likelihood of patent invalidity.
135
  A court’s analysis 
properly revolves around “whether the agreements restrict 
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent,” where the 
outer bounds of a patent’s exclusionary zone were implicitly defined 
as a deal that applied only to the allegedly infringing product, forbid 
generic entry no later than the expiration date of the patent, and did 
not create a bottleneck.
136
 
The FTC was not a party to the In re Cipro litigation, but it 
submitted an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit.  In this brief, the 
FTC began shifting gears towards a framework of analysis that would 
make reverse payment settlements presumptively illegal.  Portions of 
the FTC’s brief continued to advocate for its “hypothetical no-
payment compromise on the entry date” test.137  Yet while the FTC 
had previously announced that the challenger bore the burden of 
proving anticompetitive effects by establishing inadequate 
consideration,
138
 this requirement was omitted from the FTC’s In re 
Cipro brief.  By arguing that any settlement with a reverse payment 
and predetermined generic entry date beyond the ‘hypothetical no-
payment entry date’ was anticompetitive, without any particular 
showing by the challenger, the FTC was implicitly pursuing a rule of 
presumptive illegality.  The FTC’s only explicit request, however, 
was that reverse payment settlements not be given a per se legal safe 
harbor.
139
 
Little has been mentioned thus far of the DOJ, and for good 
reason.  From 2003 to 2009, the DOJ concertedly distanced itself 
 
 134. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 539 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) aff’d in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part sub nom. 
Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 135. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336. 
 136. See id. at 1335-36. 
 137. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Appellants and Urging 
Reversal at 16-17, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (No. 1:00-MD-01383). 
 138. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir. 2005).  See also 
Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1003-04 (2003). 
 139. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Appellants and Urging 
Reversal at 4, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (No. 1:00-MD-01383). 
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from the FTC’s fight against reverse payment settlements.  The DOJ 
first weighed in on the issue after the Supreme Court requested its 
perspective on In re Cardizem.
140
  The DOJ admitted that per se 
treatment was inappropriate,
141
 but argued that the case could be 
distinguished from the recently-decided Valley Drug and therefore 
review was unwarranted.
142
  In response to a similar request two years 
later, the DOJ recommended against the Court granting certiorari in 
Schering-Plough.
143
  Exemplifying their predilection for avoiding the 
debate, the DOJ advanced the dubious claim that the Eleventh Circuit 
panel had not fully addressed the FTC’s suggested test for liability, 
and this potential disconnect made the case a poor choice for 
review.
144
  The DOJ also focused on the absence of any pressing 
circuit split, repeating arguments from its In re Cardizem brief 
regarding why there was no inherent inconsistency between the Sixth 
and Eleventh Circuits.
145
  The Second Circuit had recently published 
its In re Tamoxifen decision, but the DOJ argued this outcome, too, 
did not conflict with Schering-Plough, despite In re Tamoxifen’s 
explicit adoption of the sham litigation rule and the DOJ’s continued 
insistence that the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough had applied a 
different test.
146
  The DOJ similarly encouraged the Court to forego 
hearing In re Tamoxifen.
147
 
Although the DOJ’s brief to the Supreme Court regarding In re 
Tamoxifen did characterize the sham litigation rule as “insufficiently 
stringent,”148 the DOJ was palpably less concerned than the FTC 
 
 140. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, In re Cardizem Antitrust Litig., 332 
F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-779).  The FTC also signed the brief alongside the DOJ, 
perhaps fearful that the Sixth Circuit’s per se framework would be struck down as too extreme, 
with a resulting invitation to courts to apply significantly more permissive filters. 
 141. Id. at 9, 12. 
 142. Id. at 11-15. 
 143. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 1. 
 144. See id. at 15-16.  On this point the DOJ appears to be on shaky footing.  It is not 
immediately clear how the Eleventh Circuit panel misunderstood or otherwise failed to engage 
with the FTC’s suggested test for liability: the court noted and rejected the Commission panel’s 
reliance on “the entry dates that ‘might have been’ agreed upon in the absence of payments as 
the determinative factor.”  Id.  This inquiry is what the FTC, in its brief, had urged the Eleventh 
Circuit to focus upon.  Compare Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005) 
with Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 44, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA), 2004 WL 3557972. 
 145. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 16-18. 
 146. Id. at 18-19. 
 147. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, In re Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830). 
 148. Id. at 1, 12-13. 
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about the potential anticompetitive effects of reverse payment 
settlements.  The DOJ departed from the FTC not just in terms of the 
extent of their skepticism, but doctrinally as well.  In contrast to the 
FTC’s subjective rule of reason approach—focused on the parties’ 
expected outcome of the litigation—the touchstone of the DOJ’s test 
during the Bush administration years was an objective analysis of the 
parties’ ex ante chances of winning the underlying patent litigation.149  
Yet despite floating this alternate rule of reason test in its briefs to the 
Supreme Court, none of the lower courts ever adopted this proposal. 
C. Explanations for Judicial Rejection of the Rule of Reason 
Framework 
1. Judicial Rejection Cannot be Explained by Mere 
Disagreement with the Antitrust Agencies’ 
Particular Rule of Reason Tests 
One could posit that courts and the antitrust agencies were 
unable to see eye-to-eye during the rule of reason phase because 
courts viewed the agencies’ particular proposals as doctrinally flawed.  
For example, courts may have been skeptical of some of the 
presumptions undergirding the FTC’s rule of reason test.  The FTC 
insisted that the generic entry date in a hypothetical settlement 
without a reverse payment would be an accurate proxy for the parties’ 
expectations of the outcome of the underlying patent litigation.
150
  But 
the presence during negotiation of varying degrees of risk aversion 
undercuts the FTC’s implicit assumption that there are no benign 
reasons for selecting an entry date earlier than the one expected as a 
result of litigation.  Particularly where substantial existing business is 
tied to a patent, the risk of “losing it all” in litigation may cause the 
patent holder to select an earlier entry date, simply because the 
additional certainty is worth sacrificing a mere possibility of even 
later generic competition.
151
  In adopting the sham litigation rule, 
 
 149. Id. at 12; Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 11 & n.1.  
The DOJ did not fully elucidate the role its “limited examination of the merits of the [patent] 
claim” would take, other than to encourage courts “at a minimum” to conduct such an inquiry 
when applying the rule of reason.   Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 
147, at 12-13. 
 150. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 151. See Sumanth Addanki & Alan J. Daskin, Patent Settlement Agreements, in 3 ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 2127, 2131 (2008); 
Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1060-62; see also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244-45 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting); but see Elhauge & Kreuger, supra note 93, at 44-45 (disputing 
the relevance of risk aversion to the determination of which reverse payment settlements are 
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several courts have cited an analogous intuition described by Judge 
Posner: “It is not ‘bad faith’ to assert patent rights that one is not 
certain will be upheld in a suit for infringement pressed to judgment 
and to settle the suit to avoid risking the loss of rights.  No one can be 
certain that he will prevail in a patent suit.”152 
The issue of risk aversion is even more salient in this context due 
to the disparate risk-to-reward ratios faced by each party during 
litigation.  In order to incentivize generic entry, Hatch-Waxman 
significantly skewed these ratios: the branded company cannot obtain 
infringement damages and thus has little upside to litigating, aside 
from protecting its existing patent; yet the branded company faces a 
devastating downside in the form of losing its patent altogether.
153
  In 
contrast, the generic company will lose only litigation costs if it 
proceeds, while enjoying a shot at a substantial upside—exclusive 
generic sales.
154
  The resulting landscape makes litigation a far more 
painful option for the branded company, and it may therefore be 
willing to accept an entry date that is earlier than it otherwise expects 
to occur as a result of litigation.  The Commission made a similar 
observation during its disposition of the Schering-Plough matter.
155
  
Courts both criticized the FTC’s standard for failing to adequately 
account for disproportionate risk
156
 and made the related remark that 
 
anticompetitive). 
 152. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 
2003); see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 992); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 
466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991.); Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 
991.); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 992.). 
 153. See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206-07. 
 154. Id.  Assuming, of course, the generic is the first filer.  Otherwise, the generic 
company’s upside is smaller, as simply one of multiple generics in the market. 
 155. See Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 991 (2003) (“The shift in the 
relative bargaining power of the litigating parties may mean—assuming other factors are held 
constant—that pioneers will have to accept earlier entry dates in settlement than they would 
otherwise have had to do.  The baseline for a competitively benign settlement may have shifted.” 
(emphasis added)); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, In re 
Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830).  If risk aversion has 
caused the “benign settlement” date to shift to an earlier timeframe, then the reverse payment 
could also be seen as purchasing time to regain the entry date that would have prevailed if the 
parties were bargaining in a risk-neutral environment.  Thus, the reverse payment would just be 
purchasing the branded company the time it lost as a result of Hatch-Waxman’s intentional risk 
restructuring. 
 156. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207; In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 
544 F.3d 1323, 1333 n.11, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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reverse payment settlements are a natural byproduct of Hatch-
Waxman.
157
 
This intuition that the Hatch-Waxman statutory scheme drives 
companies to avoid the risks of litigation and settle seems 
incompatible with the FTC’s assumption that risk aversion by the 
branded company would not artificially advance a settlement’s entry 
date.  Yet courts could have overcome any perceived oversight in the 
FTC’s arguments by incorporating consideration of risk aversion into 
a comprehensive rule of reason inquiry.  Instead, courts responded by 
rejecting the rule of reason altogether. 
The DOJ’s objective rule of reason test—premised on an 
assessment of the underlying patent litigation—provided another 
option to courts dissatisfied with the FTC’s proposal.  The DOJ 
floated its version in amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court.
158
  
Although these briefs did not fully elucidate the particular analysis 
that would drive the DOJ’s rule of reason balancing test, courts still 
could have used the DOJ’s suggestions as a foundation for building 
their own rule of reason test.  Despite skirting the potential pitfalls 
related to risk aversion, the DOJ’s approach also never gained 
momentum with the lower courts.  As with the FTC, if courts disliked 
specific aspects of the DOJ’s proposal (namely, assessing the patent’s 
validity),
159
 they could have emphasized other factors.  Yet still, 
courts responded by completely rejecting rule of reason. 
The judiciary simply distanced itself from the rule of reason 
when adjudicating these cases.
160
  Even after declaring that the 
dynamics of Hatch-Waxman push companies into settling, the Second 
 
 157. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206-07; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1074.  The DOJ 
acknowledged the same dynamic at play.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
10, In re Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830) (“The resulting 
disparity in the litigants’ respective risks may tend to increase the cost of settlement for a patent 
holder and make reverse payments more likely, even when the patent holder’s legal claims are 
relatively strong.”). 
 158. See discussion supra pp. 127-28. 
 159. See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203-04 (citing and agreeing with other courts that 
rejected the suggestion that they assess the merits of a patent’s validity). 
 160. When the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sham 
litigation rule, it approvingly noted that the lower court had properly undertaken “a full rule of 
reason analysis.”  In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008).  However, the Federal Circuit upheld the settlement under the sham litigation rule.  
See id. at 1336-37.  The apparent discrepancy is reconciled by the Federal Circuit’s conclusion 
that where “all anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement are within the exclusionary 
power of the patent, the outcome is the same whether the court begins its analysis under antitrust 
law by applying a rule of reason approach to evaluate the anti-competitive effects, or under 
patent law by analyzing the right to exclude afforded by the patent.”  Id. at 1336. 
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Circuit seemed primarily concerned with the “inevitable, lengthy, and 
expensive” trial resulting from application of the rule of reason.161  
The rejection seems to have more to do with the rule of reason 
approach itself than of any particular facet of the antitrust agencies’ 
proposals. 
2. Rule of Reason: Inconsistent with Cognitive Misers and 
In Rem Rights 
The cognitive miser phenomenon predicts the judiciary’s 
rejection of the antitrust agencies’ rule of reason balancing tests.  The 
concurrent propensity to apply a bright-line rule when dealing with 
property rights compounded the effect of the cognitive miser 
phenomenon, doubly driving the judiciary away from the antitrust 
agencies’ suggestions during their rule of reason phase. 
As discussed above, the judiciary’s conceptual link between 
patents and real property has affected the way courts analyze patent-
related disputes.  The FTC and DOJ’s rule of reason tests, then, 
presented a mode of analysis courts viewed as incongruent with the 
underlying property right at issue.  When courts apply the legal norms 
associated with in rem rights, they generally apply rules that “turn on 
one or a small number of publicly observable states of fact,”162 which 
is a stark contrast to the antitrust agencies’ rule of reason tests.  The 
merits of an underlying patent suit are quite far from publicly 
observable facts, yet disentangling such a suit was the messy 
threshold inquiry imposed by the DOJ test.  Courts would have to 
decide, based on their estimated outcome of a suit that was never 
litigated, whether to uphold a settlement as within a patent holder’s 
property rights.  Such speculation does not make it easy for the patent 
holder or the public to know the contours of the property rights at 
issue.  When presented with disputes over property rights, courts are 
accustomed to applying a bright-line rule that avoids specifying 
impermissible uses, and therefore this type of inquiry would have 
been very unintuitive to courts.  The FTC’s rule of reason test was 
similarly amorphous in terms of providing guidance to third parties 
about the contours of a patent holder’s rights.  The rallying cry of the 
sham litigation rule, that a patent holder “is entitled to defend the 
patent’s validity in court, to sue alleged infringers, and to settle with 
them, whatever its private doubts,” 163 is far more in sync with the 
 
 161. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212 n.26. 
 162. Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 803. 
 163. Compare In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 210 (2d Cir. 2006) 
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typical exclusion rule governing in rem rights than a rule of reason 
test. 
Implementing either the FTC or DOJ’s rule of reason test also 
would have posed a conceptually burdensome task.  The judiciary’s 
broad repudiation of rule of reason in this context, then, corresponds 
with a cognitive miser’s general inclination to instead apply a bright-
line rule.  The DOJ’s test required a mini patent infringement trial as a 
threshold determination, a task which is notoriously resource-
intensive.
164
  The FTC’s test was analogously complex.  Courts were 
instructed to speculate about the parties’ “hypothetical no-payment 
compromise on the entry date,” and use this date as a competitive 
baseline: any subsequent entry would be purchased protection, and 
not supplied by the patent.
165
  This is a comprehensive, holistic 
inquiry, commanding courts to first imagine a settlement that was 
never made—one without a reverse payment—and then look to the 
subjective views of the settling parties in determining the generic 
entry date they would have selected.  The plaintiffs and drug company 
defendants would conjure up different dates, each side invoking a 
boundless set of factors to buttress their estimate.  Furthermore, it 
seems likely that the parties would use the merits of the underlying 
patent suit as ammunition.  The companies would seek to show they 
believed there was at least a moderately high chance the patent would 
be upheld in court, a perception that would justify selection of a 
relatively late settlement entry date.  In general, holistic standards 
require more intensive interaction between judges and their subject 
matter,
166
 and this test is no exception.  Even though its application 
would not per se require a plenary assessment of the patent dispute, it 
threatens significant judicial engagement not only with the patented 
 
(quoting Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 702 F Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 
2003)) with, Nuisance, supra note 25, at 978. 
 164. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013) (recognizing the 
Eleventh Circuit’s “underlying practical concern” that applying antitrust scrutiny to reverse 
payment settlements might require a “time consuming, complex, and expensive” litigation 
regarding the validity of the patent); Rohm & Hass Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Patent litigation frequently is complex, long, and difficult.”). 
 165. Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 44-46, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 
1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA), 2004 WL 3557972; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 18-20, In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 1:00-MD-01383). 
 166. See Lee, supra note 6, at 62; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (1984) (“The traditional Rule of Reason falls prey to all of the limits of 
antitrust.  It assumes that judges can tap a fount of economic knowledge that does not exist, and 
it disregards the costs of judicial decisionmaking (including the costs of damning efficient 
conduct by mistake or design).”). 
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innovation and the challenger’s allegedly non-infringing alternate, but 
a host of other factors the parties would call up as ex post support to 
justify a hypothetical ex ante selection of an entry date. 
Thus while the cognitive miser phenomenon predicts courts 
would reject a rule of reason approach in favor of a bright-line rule, it 
is only partially responsible for the judiciary’s actions during the rule 
of reason period.  The tension between a rule of reason framework 
and courts’ usual treatment of property was the other major factor 
driving the judiciary’s divergence from the antitrust agencies.  This 
competing influence was removed, however, once the antitrust 
agencies began to offer up alternative bright-line rules.  The courts’ 
choice of their particular bright-line rule over these other options—
creating the intergovernmental stalemate the Supreme Court resolved 
in Actavis—can be identified as primarily a manifestation of the 
cognitive miser phenomenon. 
IV. THE QUICK-LOOK ERA 
Although they initially advocated rule of reason tests, the 
antitrust agencies have since shifted to “quick look,” a framework of 
antitrust analysis much less hospitable to defendants.  Under the quick 
look doctrine, courts conduct an abbreviated analysis.  Where a “great 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained,”167 
plaintiffs need not establish that the defendant’s conduct actually has 
caused or is likely to cause anticompetitive effects.
168
  Instead, the 
burden immediately shifts to the defendant to show procompetitive 
justifications for his conduct.
169
  In other words, the activity is 
presumptively illegal.  After its rule of reason proposal failed to gain 
any traction in the courts, the FTC began to advocate this type of 
approach.  The FTC’s posture evolved in this direction despite courts 
consistently rejecting its comparatively lenient rule of reason test in 
favor of the still more indulgent sham litigation rule.  The FTC’s 
decision to move farther away from the majority judicial approach 
was likely due to the FTC’s new partnership with the DOJ.  Since 
2009, the DOJ has assumed an active role in the fight against reverse 
payment settlements.  The result is that the DOJ and FTC are now 
unified in presenting courts with a presumptively illegal framework.  
As Part III will discuss, the quick-look tests offered by the antitrust 
 
 167. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 168. Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at 
Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 40. 
 169. See id. 
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agencies supply a fairly formalistic approach to resolving challenges 
to reverse payment settlements.  But the district and appellate courts, 
with one recent exception, continued to utilize their own formalistic 
approach, the sham litigation rule.  The selection of this particular 
bright-line rule is a classic manifestation of the cognitive miser 
phenomenon. 
A. Antitrust Agencies Unite to Advocate for “Quick-look” 
Treatment 
1. DOJ Sets Forth a Quick-Look Test 
In the summer of 2009 the DOJ abandoned its previous 
noncommittal attitude, presenting a radically different perspective on 
reverse payment settlements in response to a request from the 
Supreme Court for input on Arkansas Carpenters.
170
  Notably, this is 
the first post-Bush administration brief submitted by the DOJ on this 
topic.
171
  In contrast to the DOJ’s previous muddled writings on the 
topic, the DOJ put forth a specific, and aggressive, test for when 
reverse payment settlements should be deemed to violate antitrust 
laws.
172
  Although ostensibly seeking to apply the rule of reason,
173
 
the DOJ’s test avoids a totality of the circumstances inquiry and 
instead applies a quick-look test by making reverse payment 
settlements presumptively unlawful.
174
 
The DOJ’s test was far more inquiry-truncating than a rule of 
reason approach.  Reflecting rationales first articulated by the 
Commission in its Schering-Plough decision, the DOJ explained that 
because the generic entry date parties would choose in the absence of 
payment reflects their perception of the likelihood of prevailing at 
trial, a settlement encompassing a reverse payment is “naturally 
viewed” as purchasing a longer period of exclusion, absent any other 
 
 170. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 1, Arkansas 
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-2851-
cv(L)). 
 171. See Steven Seidenberg, The Flip Side of ‘Reverse Payments,’ ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 1, 
2010, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_flip_side_of_reverse_payments/. 
 172. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
24.  This test is reminiscent of the framework of analysis applied by the Commission in its 
Schering-Plough decision, except that the antitrust agencies do not bear the burden of proving 
inadequate consideration.  See Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988, 991 (2003). 
 173. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
24. 
 174. Id. at 9-10. 
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consideration provided by the generic manufacturer.
175
  Based on the 
assumption that a settlement featuring both a reverse payment and a 
predetermined entry date in the future involved the purchase of 
additional exclusion time, the DOJ argued reverse payment 
settlements should be considered presumptively anticompetitive.
176
  
Plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing of the existence of a 
reverse payment settlement—by pointing to a settlement that included 
both a payment from a branded company to a generic and an 
agreement to end litigation and set a future generic entry date—before 
the burden shifts to the defendant companies.
177
 
In order for the settlement to survive, defendants must rebut a 
plaintiff’s prima facie case, by showing that the settlement did not 
result in a level of competition significantly less than they expected to 
occur if the patent suit was litigated to a final judgment.
178
  If the 
defendants can show that the amount of the reverse payment is 
roughly in line with the litigation costs avoided by the patent holder, 
then they have met their burden of proof.
179
  In contrast, if the amount 
of the payment is “greatly in excess” of saved litigation costs, the 
defendants will need to show that “despite the reverse payment, the 
agreed upon entry date and other terms of entry reasonably reflected 
[the brand and generic companies’] contemporaneous evaluations of 
the likelihood that a judgment in the patent litigation would have 
resulted in generic competition before patent expiration.”180  The DOJ 
admitted some reverse payment settlements may lead to a level of 
competition greater than what would have occurred as a result of 
 
 175. Compare Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 
170, at 21-22, with Schering-Plough et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 987-88 (2003).  However, the DOJ’s 
test differed from the Commission’s proposed test in that instead of estimating generic entry that 
would have occurred under a settlement without a reverse payment, the DOJ suggested that 
courts estimate the generic entry that would have occurred if the parties had not settled at all, 
and instead the patent litigation reached a final judgment.  See Brief for the United States in 
Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 28. 
 176. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, 
at 22.  But see Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 88 (arguing that the DOJ’s position that reverse 
payment settlements are presumptively anticompetitive rests on erroneous assumptions). 
 177. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
23, 27. 
 178. Id. at 28. 
 179. Id. at 28-29. 
 180. Id. at 30-31.  See also Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 93, at 297-312 (setting forth a 
mathematical proof indicating that “when a reverse payment exceeds the patent holder’s 
anticipated litigation costs, a court can be confident that” the settlement is anticompetitive, 
absent very narrow grounds for rebuttal). 
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litigation.
181
  Such an outcome would only affect claims for damages, 
however, and the DOJ did not view it as weighty enough to justify a 
rule of reason liability standard.
182
  The DOJ explicitly disavowed any 
type of embedded trial regarding the merits of the underlying patent 
litigation, warning that it would “unduly complicate” an antitrust 
case.
183
 
The DOJ’s quick-look test explicitly contradicted two positions 
the DOJ had made in its earlier, otherwise noncommittal briefs to the 
Supreme Court.  First, the DOJ had previously noted that a rule of law 
which subjects reverse payment settlements to “near-automatic 
invalidation” could “potentially frustrate” the ability of patent holders 
to exclude competition falling within the scope of their patent’s 
protection.
184
  This concern fell by the wayside when the DOJ 
switched to a test with a starting presumption of illegality.  Second, 
the DOJ had argued that the competing values of patent and antitrust 
law merited a test that would objectively calculate the parties’ relative 
chances of winning the underlying patent litigation, by looking to an 
ex ante assessment of “evidence extrinsic to the settlement.”185  The 
DOJ had criticized the FTC’s contemporaneous approach of 
imagining a hypothetical no-payment settlement date, because it gave 
too much weight to the parties’ own views of their relative chances of 
success.
186
  Starting in 2009, however, the DOJ adamantly rejected 
any such “objective” inquiry into the merits of the underlying patent 
litigation, instead embracing a subjective quick-look test.
187
 
2. FTC Shifts to Quick-Look 
The FTC began its final phase of evolution by introducing a 
quick-look test inspired by the DOJ’s earlier objective rule of reason 
approach.  When hearing In re Androgel, the Eleventh Circuit was 
faced with yet another challenge to a reverse payment settlement.
188
  
The FTC attempted to reinterpret and reframe Valley Drug and 
 
 181. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
24-25. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 25-27. 
 184. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 10-11. 
 185. Id. at 10-12. 
 186. See id. at 11-12. 
 187. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, 
at 24-25; see also id. at 26 n.9 (acknowledging “some tension” between the DOJ’s previous 
writings and its current views). 
 188. See In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010) 
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Schering-Plough as capable of coexisting with a presumptively illegal 
test.
189
  In its brief to the district court, the FTC admitted it had 
previously interpreted Eleventh Circuit case law as requiring the same 
“end-of-patent-term standard”190 that the Second and Federal Circuits 
used.
191
  The FTC emphasized, however, the “ambiguity” in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s past decisions, such that the task of examining the 
“scope of the exclusionary power of the patent” did not foreclose 
analyzing the strength of the underlying patent as an element of this 
inquiry.
192
  Under this view, a patent that is likely invalid or not 
infringed simply does not have the same exclusionary power as a 
“strong patent.”193  Thus, although a court facing an antitrust 
challenge need not “assess direct evidence of the underlying patent 
 
 189. See Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss at 14, In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 
1:09-CV-00955-TWT). 
 190. Also referred to as the sham litigation standard. 
 191. See Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss at 14, In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 
1:09-CV-00955-TWT). 
 192. Id. at 14-15.  In its brief to the Eleventh Circuit regarding Schering-Plough, the FTC 
had originally read Valley Drug as adopting a rule much like the one it articulated during the In 
re Androgel litigation.  See Brief of Respondent Fed. Trade Comm’n at 16, Schering-Plough v. 
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688).  Under this interpretation, the requirement 
to analyze the “exclusionary potential” of the patent mandated an inquiry into “[h]ow successful 
the patentee was likely to be in excluding” the generic challenger, in other words, an evaluation 
of the merits of the underlying patent litigation.  Id.  Following Schering-Plough, the FTC 
viewed the Eleventh Circuit as adopting the sham litigation rule.  See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 14-15, Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688).  
In its In re Androgel brief, however, the FTC argued that Valley Drug and Schering-Plough 
adopted a framework distinct from sham litigation.  Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s 
Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 191, at 14.  In support of 
this contention, the FTC cited Valley Drug’s remand to the district court “for consideration of 
the ‘protection afforded by the patents’ based on ‘the likelihood of [the patentee] obtaining such 
protections’ at the time of the agreement.”  Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 
344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)).  The FTC also found support for its new interpretation in 
the last paragraph of the Schering-Plough opinion, which mentioned the “need to evaluate the 
strength of the patent.”  Id. (quoting Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1076).  Since 2006, the DOJ 
had similarly argued that the Eleventh Circuit caselaw allows, or at least does not foreclose, an 
inquiry into the strength of the patent.  See Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra 
note 123, at 22-24.  The case for ambiguity is made more plausible by the full history of Valley 
Drug: after the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a consideration of the 
“exclusionary potential” of the patent, the district court proceeded to analyze the likely outcome 
of the pending patent litigation.  In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 
1279, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2005).  Such an inquiry, according to the district court, was mandated by 
Valley Drug’s holding; if this was a misconception, the Schering-Plough court did nothing to 
correct it. 
 193. Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 191, at 20. 
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claims,” courts cannot disregard “complaint allegations that the patent 
was invalid or so narrow that it would not prevent generic entry on its 
own.”194  Correspondingly, the FTC articulated a new test consistent 
with its updated interpretation of Valley Drug and Schering-Plough: if 
an objective analysis of the underlying patent litigation, made at the 
time the settlement was formed, indicates it is more likely than not 
that the generic product would have ultimately entered earlier than the 
date allowed by the settlement terms—either “through final resolution 
of the patent litigation or through entry not stopped by a preliminary 
injunction”—then the payment “must be seen” as purchasing delay, 
and as such, the settlement is unlawful.
195
 
In other words, the FTC attempted to persuade the Eleventh 
Circuit that under the first prong of the Valley Drug/Schering-Plough 
test—which inquires into the exclusionary potential of the patent—the 
court should analyze a patent’s strength in a type of mini-trial, and 
use this result to discount the official length of a patent’s protection.  
This calculation generates a length of patent protection provided by 
the patent itself, and the FTC assumes in a but-for world where the 
parties never settled, generic entry on average would have occurred 
immediately after the expected length of patent protection.  A later 
generic entry date under a settlement is presumed to have been 
purchased by the reverse payment, in violation of antitrust law (absent 
proof by the defendants of offsetting procompetitive effects).  This 
test harkens back to the DOJ’s original suggestion that courts analyze 
the merits of the underlying patent litigation, an inquiry which the 
FTC had previously disavowed in favor of a subjective inquiry into 
the parties’ expectations regarding generic entry.  The difference 
between the two is that while the DOJ incorporated this inquiry into a 
rule of reason balancing test,
196
 the FTC suggested it as the starting 
point of a presumptively illegal rule.
197
 
The In re Androgel district court refused to consider the scope of 
the patent as diminished by the probability that a patent holder would 
litigate and lose, describing such a view of a patent’s exclusionary 
 
 194. Id. at 1-2, 25. 
 195. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n at 21-32, FTC v. Watson Pharm., 
Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00955-TWT (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2012).  Alternately, if the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals viewed its precedents as establishing an end-of-patent-term (or sham 
litigation) rule, then the FTC urged the court to adopt the “presumptively illegal” rule articulated 
by the DOJ in its Arkansas Carpenters brief.  Id. at 43-44. 
 196. See Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 11. 
 197. Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 191, at 3-4. 
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power as inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Valley 
Drug.
198
  In an emphatic opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court, rebuffing the FTC’s invitation for it to engage in the 
“turducken task” of “deciding a patent case within an antitrust case 
about the settlement of the patent case.”199  The court put aside any 
ambiguity about its precedent and explicitly upheld the reverse 
payment settlement under the sham litigation rule.
200
 
The FTC’s In re Androgel briefs were written against the 
backdrop of the Eleventh Circuit’s relatively extensive experience 
with reverse payment settlements.  In contrast, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals was contemporaneously facing a case of first impression.  
The suit arrived to the Third Circuit following the district court’s 
application of the sham litigation rule.
201
  Notably, that same week, 
another district court in the Third Circuit also announced it would 
adopt the sham litigation rule.
202
  Working from a clean slate in the 
Third Circuit, the FTC chose to advance the DOJ’s new quick-look 
test. 
203
 
For the first time, the efforts of the antitrust agencies were met 
with success. The Third Circuit in In re K-Dur adopted a 
presumptively illegal test, although it did not rely on the DOJ’s 
suggestion to tether the analysis to the settling parties’ subjective 
views of the patent litigation’s likely resolution.204  Under the Third 
Circuit’s test, any payment from a branded company to a generic 
 
 198. In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 199. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 200. Id. at 1312. 
 201. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG), 2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 
2009) report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652 JAG, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 25, 2010). 
 202. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514, 528-29 (E.D. 
Pa. 2010), abrogated by In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 203. Brief of the Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging 
Reversal at 24-26, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., No. 10-2077 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010); see also 
Rosch, supra note 104.  While this may seem to be an abrupt change from the “merits of the 
patent litigation” quick-look test it was pressing upon the Eleventh Circuit in In re Androgel, the 
FTC was making a strategic decision.  If the Eleventh Circuit interpreted its earlier ambiguous 
“exclusionary potential of the patent” language as encompassing an inquiry into the patent’s 
validity, then it could adopt the FTC’s offering—and officially turn away from the sham 
litigation rule—without breaking from precedent.  Although the FTC gave the In re Androgel 
court an opportunity to adopt a quick-look test without explicitly reversing course, the FTC still 
had a backup argument.  Should the court interpret its prior case law as adopting a sham 
litigation rule, the FTC urged it to split with precedent and adopt the quick-look test set forth by 
the DOJ in Arkansas Carpenters.  Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 
195, at 43-44. 
 204. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. 
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would be prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.  The settling 
parties can overcome this presumption by producing evidence either 
of adequate consideration that the branded company received in 
exchange for the payment or an increase in competition as a result of 
the payment.
205
  The Third Circuit also confirmed that it would not 
look to the merits of the underlying patent litigation.
206
 
The rigorous scrutiny requested by the antitrust agencies and 
imposed by the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur stands as an anomaly to 
the deferential treatment accorded to patent holders by the 
overwhelming majority of lower courts throughout the decade 
spanning from Valley Drug up to Actavis.  The sham litigation rule’s 
popularity even spread to state courts as well.  In October 2011, the 
California Court of Appeals affirmed an earlier Superior Court 
decision applying the sham litigation rule to uphold a reverse payment 
settlement as valid under the state’s analogue to the Sherman Act.207 
By ultimately requiring “the FTC [to] prove its case as in other 
rule-of-reason cases,” the Supreme Court in Actavis adopted what 
could be viewed as a compromise between the bright-line rule popular 
in the lower courts and the one preferred by the antitrust agencies.
208
  
Although the Supreme Court ended the intergovernmental stalemate, 
it is important to understand why the courts selected the approach 
they did, because the conceptual factors that propelled courts toward 
the sham litigation rule will impact how they structure their rule of 
reason analyses. 
B. Why did the Courts not see Eye-to-Eye with the Antitrust 
Agencies? 
The utter lack of common ground between the lower courts and 
the antitrust agencies raises the question of why courts maintained—
in the face of increasingly insistent objection from the antitrust 
agencies—that reverse payment settlements deserve such permissive 
treatment.  While doctrinal disagreement with the two quick-look 
 
 205. Id.  As an example of the latter method of rebutting the prima facie case, the court 
cited the scenario where “a modest cash payment . . . enables a cash-starved generic 
manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug.”  Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 169 (Cal. App. 4th. 2011), review 
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (“We hold that a settlement of a lawsuit to enforce a patent 
does not violate the Cartwright Act if the settlement restrains competition only within the scope 
of the patent, unless the patent was procured by fraud or the suit for its enforcement was 
objectively baseless.”). 
 208. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
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tests could provide at least a partial justification, the cognitive miser 
phenomenon offers a persuasive explanation for the adoption of the 
sham litigation rule. 
1. Judicial Rejection of the Quick-Look Tests Moves 
Beyond Doctrinal Disagreement 
Under one view, the continued gap between the courts and 
antitrust agencies during the quick-look phase could simply reflect 
disagreement with either the general appropriateness of quick-look or 
the specific iterations proposed by the agencies. 
Quick-look is an important tool in the antitrust analysis, but it is 
not a multipurpose tool, and courts may have disputed the propriety of 
applying quick look in this context.  Quick-look should be used only 
in limited circumstances, namely “when the great likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”209  Where a 
defendant can articulate “plausibly” procompetitive effects, such that 
a court cannot “initially dismiss [them] as presumptively wrong,” 
quick-look review is inappropriate.
210
  Some commentators have 
argued that there are credible procompetitive justifications for reverse 
payment settlements.
211
  Even the DOJ has acknowledged the 
existence of plausible procompetitive effects.
212
  Those who criticized 
the use of quick-look scrutiny were vindicated when the Court in 
Actavis explicitly rejected as inappropriate the FTC’s invitation “to 
proceed via a ‘quick look’ approach.”213  Yet courts never relied on 
this explanation in their decisions, and even if it was sub silentio 
driving their rejection of the quick-look approach, this justification 
would not explain why courts chose the sham litigation rule instead. 
Even assuming that the quick-look approach constituted the 
proper level of scrutiny in this context,
214
 one could argue that courts 
 
 209. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 210. Id. at 775. 
 211. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 112-13.  For these reasons, Butler and Jarosch 
argue that the DOJ’s quick-look framework is inappropriate.  Id. at 113-14.  The authors focus 
on both direct and indirect procompetitive effects, such as greater long-term investment and 
innovation.  See also Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the 
Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 504 (2007); Daniel A. 
Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and 
Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 760-65 (2004) (describing the “innovation costs” 
of prohibiting reverse payment settlements); Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1060-67. 
 212. For an explanation of why the DOJ believes quick-look is appropriate here, see Brief 
for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 24-25. 
 213. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 214. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 195, at 18-19 
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rejected the quick-look tests advanced by the antitrust agencies 
because they were uncomfortable with the premise of these particular 
proposals.  Both the FTC’s objective quick-look test from In re 
Androgel and the subjective quick-look test suggested by the DOJ in 
Arkansas Carpenters implicate the concept of probabilistic patent 
protection, which has drawn vocal criticism. 
Under the objective quick-look test (as presented by the FTC to 
the Eleventh Circuit in the Actavis litigation), a reverse payment 
settlement would be struck down if a court determines it is more 
likely than not that the patent holder would have lost his suit against 
the generic.
215
  Application of this test generates an objective estimate 
(as viewed from the time of the settlement’s formation) of the 
probability the patent holder would have successfully wielded his 
patent in court to exclude a generic challenger.  If that probability is 
below 50% then the reverse payment settlement is unlawful.
216
  The 
Eleventh Circuit strongly rejected the contention that a patent holder 
with a 49% chance of winning its patent dispute—in other words, a 
patent holder likely to lose—should be deemed to have a patent with 
an exclusionary potential of zero.
217
  A patent, the court insisted, must 
be given its full “potential exclusionary power” when determining the 
scope of the right to exclude.
218
 
The subjective quick-look test relies on a similar presumption of 
probabilistic protection.  Where the settlement’s date of generic entry 
does not occur until the patent’s expiration, the defendants have failed 
to rebut the prima facie case of anticompetitive effects, even if the 
parties to the settlement establish their genuine belief that the trial 
court more likely than not would have barred generic entry until the 
date of patent expiration.
219
  The DOJ rationalized this facet of its 
 
(articulating several factors which make reverse payment settlements worthy of the skepticism 
attached to quick-look analysis); see generally Elhauge & Krieger, supra note 93. 
 215. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 195, at 22. 
 216. In re Androgel involved an appeal from the district court’s grant of defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, based on an FTC complaint alleging the patent holder was “not likely to 
prevail” in its suit against the generic challengers.  FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 
1301 (11th Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, the appeal focused on whether ‘unlikely to prevail’ 
sufficiently pled an antitrust violation.  Id.  The implication of the FTC’s test is that when a 
patent holder is likely to win its underlying suit, the settlement would not constitute an antitrust 
violation.  However, the FTC did not discuss the level of scrutiny to be applied in the latter 
scenario. 
 217. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
29. 
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quick-look test by explaining that given multiple settlement cases 
involving a generic company with less than a 50% chance of winning, 
at least one such case litigated to conclusion would “presumably” 
result in the generic challenger winning and entering.
220
  Therefore, a 
reverse payment settlement with entry timed at the patent’s expiration 
would be “anticompetitive because it eliminates the possibility of 
competition from the generic prior to the expiration of the patent.”221  
This argument reflects the assumption, advanced by some economists, 
that “consumers have a ‘property right’ to the level of competition 
that would have prevailed, on average, had the two parties litigated 
the patent dispute to a resolution in the courts.”222  The theory takes a 
macro view, aggregating hypothetical potential reverse payment 
settlements and emphasizing that even if the patent holder was 
significantly more likely than not to prevail in each suit, if all were 
litigated, then on average some generic entry would have occurred 
prior to settlement.  Because consumers have a property right in that 
“possibility of competition” prior to the expiration of the patent, 
destruction of the possibility is anticompetitive.  These arguments are 
the flip side of the probabilistic patent protection coin: the probability 
a patent will fail to enable its holder to exclude a generic challenger is 
the possibility of competition, and this possibility should inure to 
consumers’ benefit. 
With near uniformity, the lower courts criticized probabilistic 
patent protection as incompatible with the rights accorded to patent 
holders.
223
  As one court noted, adopting the “concept of a public 
property right in the outcome of private lawsuits” would be 
tantamount to imposing an unprecedented “duty to use patent-derived 
market power in a way that imposes the lowest monopoly rents on the 
 
 220. Id. at 30. 
 221. Id. at 29-30. 
 222. See Shapiro, supra note 106, at 396.  Carl Shapiro held the position of Chief 
Economist at the Antitrust Division of DOJ from 2009-2011.  Haas Faculty Serve in Federal 
Government, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKLEY, 
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/faculty/gov.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). See also In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(describing the FTC’s “reli[ance] on the economic analysis advocated by Professor Carl Shapiro 
regarding consumers’ ‘expected’ gain from the patent challenge”). 
 223. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2012); In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re K-Dur 
Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG), 2009 WL 508869, at *24–25 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2009) 
report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652 JAG, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J. Mar. 
25, 2010); but see In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
JENNY  4/2/2014  11:01 PM 
274 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 30 
consumer.”224  Commentators have pointed out that allowing a 
plaintiff to leverage even a low possibility of harm into actual harm is 
a radical departure from traditional civil burdens of proof, which 
require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was more likely than 
not the source of his harm.
225
  Potentially anticompetitive agreements 
are also generally held to this same standard; even if there is a 
possibility of diminished competition, the agreement will not be 
struck down unless that possibility is more likely than not to occur.
226
  
In contrast, the “probabilistic patent protection” school of thought 
effectively condemns an agreement if any possibility of diminished 
competition results.  Marc Schildkraut, former Assistant Director of 
the FTC, has expounded up the unusual nature of this approach: 
Consider, first, a merger subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  
The parties to the merger freely concede that the merger has no 
efficiency benefits.  The merging parties are not direct competitors.  
There is, however, a 10 percent chance that the acquirer will enter 
the acquired party’s market in the next few years.  Under the 
[probabilistic patent protection theory], the merger should surely 
be condemned—there is a 10 percent diminution of uncertain 
competition.
 
 Of course, antitrust tribunals using . . . traditional 
civil standards would not condemn this merger.
227
 
Applying either of the agencies’ quick-look tests would entail 
adopting the probabilistic patent protection theory, including 
implications that are arguably incongruous with the standard judicial 
approach to antitrust challenges specifically and causation more 
generally.  Although the majority’s opinion in Actavis was premised 
on an acceptance of the probabilistic patent protection theory, the 
dissent mounted a fervent attack on the coherence of this theory, 
particularly when taken to its logical extensions.
228
  Courts may have 
had valid doctrinal reasons for selecting alternate frameworks. 
 
 224. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531–32 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 225. Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1049 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 433B cmt. 1 (1965)); see also Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs., & Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., No. 9297, 2002 WL 1488085, at *1 (F.T.C. June 27, 2002).  There are exceptions, 
of course, including strict liability and comprehensive statutory schemes, such as the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which dispenses with the causation requirement for 
individuals who suffer certain delineated side effects following administration of a vaccine.  See 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1073-74 (2011). 
 226. Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1049. 
 227. Id. at 1050. 
 228. Compare FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013), with Schildkraut, supra 
note 106, at 2240 (Robert, C.J., dissenting). 
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Beyond doctrinal disagreement, the credibility of the antitrust 
agencies on the topic of reverse payment settlements may have been 
burdened by the judiciary’s sense of whiplash over the past decade.  
Both agencies have significantly altered their approaches, generally 
with little justification.  The DOJ began by vaguely intimating that an 
objective assessment of the merits must be utilized as part of a rule of 
reason approach.
229
  It then switched to a subjective inquiry,
230
 
rejecting its previous suggestion to litigate the patent infringement 
question as “neither necessary nor appropriate.”231  Not only did the 
mode of analysis shift, but the DOJ’s entire attitude transformed.  
Initially the DOJ adopted a solicitous posture, noting that the “public 
policy favoring settlements, and the statutory right of patentees to 
exclude competition within the scope of their patents, would 
potentially be frustrated by a rule of law that subjected patent 
settlements involving reverse payments to automatic or near-
automatic invalidation.”232  The DOJ later insisted the settlements 
should be viewed as presumptively unlawful.
233
  Although the FTC’s 
attitude toward reverse payment settlements has been consistently 
chilly, it has undergone a similarly lurching evolution in terms of 
suggested frameworks.  After a brief stint of advocating a per se 
illegal prohibition, the FTC attempted to persuade courts to adopt a 
subjective assessment of the parties’ expectations, as embodied in a 
“hypothetical no-payment compromise on the entry date.”234  Despite 
initially rejecting as deeply flawed any attempts to objectively assess 
the merits of the underlying patent litigation,
235
 the FTC would later 
offer up such a test in the In re Androgel litigation, while almost 
simultaneously signing on to the DOJ’s new subjective quick-look 
test.  To the extent these changes signal the speaker’s uncertainty as to 
how reverse payment settlements should be reviewed, courts may 
have been even more inclined to disregard the antitrust agencies’ 
offerings altogether. 
 
 229. See Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 11. 
 230. The focus is on a “comparison between competition under the settlement and with 
what [the defendants] expected had the patent infringement suit been litigated to judgment.”  
Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 28. 
 231. Id. at 24. 
 232. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 10-11. 
 233. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
10. 
 234. Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 44, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 
(11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA), 2004 WL 3557972. 
 235. Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 998 (2003). 
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But even if the strong trend of courts rejecting the antitrust 
agencies’ proffered tests could be chalked up to tarnished credibility 
or doctrinal disagreement, it would leave unresolved the question of 
why courts coalesced around the sham litigation rule as their 
particular resolution.  This rule is not without its own doctrinal 
weaknesses; yet the lower courts tended to respond to criticism by 
raising up as a shield both the law’s general preference for settlement 
and the specific factors incentivizing settlement between companies 
acting under the shadow of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme.
236
  
But settlement is no panacea.  Some commentators have attacked “the 
standard presumption that settlement should always be encouraged,” 
pointing out that settlements bear attendant costs because they can 
“reduce the legal system’s ability to distinguish between legitimate 
and harmful activities.”237  Criticism of the sham litigation rule 
derives from just such a concern, namely that generously allowing 
settlement here will fail to deter patent holders from diverting some of 
their monopoly profits to potential generic competitors who could, 
and otherwise would, legitimately enter the market without infringing 
on the patent.
238
  Courts were persistently undeterred by the 
suggestion that this may be one of the areas where settlement imposes 
significant adverse spillover effects.  As the Second Circuit explained, 
settlement in this context is to be encouraged, “even if it leads in 
some cases to the survival of monopolies created by what would 
otherwise be fatally weak patents.”239  Furthermore, courts generally 
sidestepped the issue of whether, despite achieving the traditional 
benefits of settlement, the parties’ agreement nonetheless violated 
antitrust laws. 
The nearly unwavering judicial trajectory in support of the sham 
litigation rule is also noteworthy given how little the courts engaged 
with allegations of misplaced reliance on the statutory presumption of 
validity.
240
  This presumption is often cited as the reason d’être for 
viewing reverse payment settlements as valid and logical extensions 
of a patent holder’s right to exclude.241  There is a heightened 
 
 236. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 237. Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can 
Reduce the Legal System’s Ability to Induce Efficient Behavior, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 1355, 1366, 
1373 (2008). 
 238. Id. at 1372 & n.75. 
 239. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 240. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (West 2013) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”) 
 241. See, e.g., In re Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211; Schering-
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standard of proof connected to this presumption, and a challenger can 
only overcome it by presenting clear and convincing evidence, rather 
than a preponderance of the evidence.
242
  Yet as the Federal Circuit 
has explained, the statutory presumption of validity is but “a 
procedural device,” serving to place the burden of persuasion on the 
alleged infringer.
243
  As such, when patent holders seek a preliminary 
injunction, for example, they cannot rely upon the presumption as 
affirmative evidence they will win on the merits.
244
  Some 
commentators have argued that allowing patent holders to obtain 
antitrust immunity based on the presumption of validity enables the 
statutory presumption to be transformed from a procedural device into 
substantive evidence of validity, despite the Federal Circuit’s well-
established prohibition on such a maneuver.
245
  In the course of 
adopting and applying the sham litigation rule, even the Federal 
Circuit cited the presumption of validity but did not engage with this 
line of reasoning.
246
  The Third Circuit identified this same criticism 
as one basis for its rejection of the sham litigation rule.
247
 
To the extent the sham litigation rule is premised upon the 
presumption of validity, its foundations are even shakier where the 
underlying patent suit involves only claims of non-infringement.  
Although courts have cited the statutory presumption of validity as a 
factor compelling their adoption of the sham litigation rule and 
corresponding rejection of the concept of probabilistic patent 
protection, there is no statutory presumption of infringement or non-
infringement.  Consequentially, when a branded company files a suit 
alleging infringement, it bears the burden of proving that the 
 
Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 242. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2247 (2011). 
 243. New Eng. Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 64 (2009); Joseph Vardner, Note, The Statutory 
Presumption of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 225, 231-35 (2011).  
See also Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 18-
19 (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 
F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Other commentators have argued that it is particularly 
misguided to place such great reliance on the presumption of validity because flaws in the patent 
approval process create significant doubts about the validity of the underlying patent in the first 
place.  See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 
323, 333-36 (2008). 
 246. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 247. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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competitor’s product infringes on its patent.248  The rationale for 
rejecting probabilistic patent protection does not fully translate to a 
reverse payment settlement borne out of allegations of infringement, 
rather than invalidity. 
This tension was particularly palpable in In re K-Dur.
249
  The 
plaintiffs argued their case merited application of a rule other than 
sham litigation because infringement, and not validity, was the 
original point of contention between the branded and generic 
companies.
250
  Surely, they explained, the absence of an infringement 
presumption implies there is but a probability the generic would be 
kept off the market, and therefore courts should view patent 
protection as probabilistic.
251
  Despite acknowledging the lack of a 
statutory presumption of infringement, the In re K-Dur district court 
refused to “discount the exclusionary power of [the] patent based on 
the possibility that it was not infringed by the [generic products].”252  
The court’s rationale for this position amounted to little more than 
pointing out that, despite the absence of a presumption of non-
infringement, there is no statutory presumption of infringement, and if 
the court discounted the patent’s exclusionary power by the likelihood 
of non-infringement, it would be tantamount to assuming 
infringement existed.
253
  The FTC had also raised this point in 
Schering-Plough and In re Cipro, but both courts of appeals rejected 
the argument and insisted on applying the sham litigation rule, 
regardless of the type of underlying claim.
254
  This line of thinking 
has been particularly criticized because excluding non-infringing 
drugs cannot lie within a patent’s exclusionary scope.255  The Third 
 
 248. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 249. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG), 2009 WL 508869, at *25 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 6, 2009) report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652 JAG, 2010 WL 1172995 
(D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010), rev’d 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See id. 
 254. The FTC argued in Schering-Plough that because Valley Drug’s underlying patent 
litigation dealt with a claim of invalidity and Schering-Plough’s dealt with infringement, the 
Eleventh Circuit should analyze the latter under a framework distinct from Valley Drug; the 
court disagreed.  Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075-76 (11th Cir. 2005).  In re 
Cipro dealt with an underlying patent suit involving both claims of invalidity and non-
infringement, but the Federal Circuit panel did not differentiate between the two types of suits, 
and instead broadly held that unless the litigation was a sham, inquiry into the patent’s validity 
was inappropriate.  See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1328, 1337. 
 255. See, e.g., Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: 
Presumptions, Procedural Burdens, and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, 26 
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Circuit represented the views of many of the sham litigation rule’s 
detractors when it characterized application of the rule as “particularly 
misguided” in the infringement context.256 
Judicial insistence on creating a broad safe harbor within which 
parties to patent litigation can freely settle on a relatively expansive 
set of potential terms created a chasm between the perspective of the 
antitrust agencies and the lower courts (with the exception of the 
Third Circuit’s defection).257  By coalescing around a presumption of 
illegality, the antitrust agencies were inclined to err on the side of 
overdeterrence and capture all anticompetitive settlements, even if 
legitimate ones were struck down in the process.  Indeed the DOJ has 
admitted that under its rule, some reverse payment settlements that 
would otherwise create more competition than if the parties had not 
settled may be terminated.
258
  In contrast, the sham litigation rule 
reflects a preference for underdeterrence.  Even if a reverse payment 
settlement may have delayed generic entry, the lower courts were 
willing to let it survive, displaying a remarkable hesitancy to revisit 
the intricacies of a settlement.
259
  These fundamentally different 
preferences for how reverse payment settlements should be treated 
moves beyond simple dissatisfaction with the particular frameworks 
 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 141, 162 (2010). 
 256. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 257. Politics may initially appear to be a tempting explanation for the impasse, particularly 
given the composition of the majority and the dissent in Actavis.  (Justice Breyer, writing for 
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, rejected the sham litigation rule, while the 
more conservative trio of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas would have 
approved the use of the sham litigation rule.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  
Justice Alito was recused from the proceedings).  Id.  To be sure, the sham litigation rule’s 
sharpest critics in the lower courts were also concentrated amongst the appointees of Democratic 
presidents, for example: Judge Pooler (Clinton, Second Circuit), In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006) (Pooler, J. dissenting), and Judge Sloviter 
(Carter, Third Circuit), In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d.  But judges appointed by both 
Democratic and Republican presidents perpetuated the trend in the lower courts by adopting the 
sham litigation rule, for example: Judge Anderson (Carter, Eleventh Circuit), Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (Judge Anderson authored the Valley Drug 
opinion), Judge Sack (Clinton, Second Circuit), In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d, Judge Trager 
(Clinton, E.D.N.Y.), In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), Judge Greenaway (Clinton, D. N.J., Obama, Third Circuit), In re K-Dur Antitrust 
Litig., 338 F. Supp. 2d 517 (D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2004), and Judge Kravitch (Carter, Eleventh 
Circuit) and Judge Farris (Carter, Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation).  FTC v. Watson Pharm., 
Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 258. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, 
at 24-25; see also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 120-21 (explaining that the DOJ framework 
will lead to an increase in Type I errors). 
 259. See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 
466 F.3d 187, 212 & n.26 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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suggested by the antitrust agencies, and hints at some additional 
motivation for the judiciary’s course of action.  The especial burdens 
generated by patent litigation, which would be rendered even greater 
if a rule of overdeterrence with respect to settling was adopted, was 
pushing the judiciary towards the adoption of a permissive bright-line 
rule. 
2. Courts as Cognitive Misers 
Judicial adoption of the sham litigation rule bears a strong 
resemblance to judges acting as cognitive misers, particularly given 
that many of the district and appellate judges faced with reverse 
payment settlement cases do not have the patent law expertise of the 
Federal Circuit.  When employing the sham litigation rule, courts 
appeared content to uphold reverse payment settlements so long as 
they allowed for entry prior to patent expiration and did not evince a 
palpable manipulation of Hatch-Waxman, for example by creating a 
bottleneck or obtaining a thirty-month stay via the filing of 
objectively baseless litigation.  Otherwise, courts have explained that 
if a patent really is weak, generic companies will continue to attack it, 
and a brand-name manufacturer will not be able to afford ongoing 
protection through repeated reverse payment settlements.
260
  
Manipulation of Hatch-Waxman and entry prior to patent expiration 
served as the cognitive shortcuts by which judges would decide 
whether to strike down a reverse payment settlement under antitrust 
law.  If a reverse payment settlement fell within a broad safe harbor, 
the court needed to undergo only minimal engagement with both the 
patented innovation at issue and the details of the consideration the 
parties exchanged.  When viewed from the perspective of cognitive 
misers, judicial willingness to cling to the sham litigation rule was a 
symptom of the search for a bright-line rule-based approach. 
Yet the FTC’s objective quick-look test and the DOJ’s subjective 
quick-look test are both relatively formalistic, and both are what 
Professor Louis Kaplow would term “presumptive rules,” in that the 
“rule applies unless there appears to be sufficient reason not to apply 
it.”261  Therefore at first blush, adopting either of these frameworks 
 
 260. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012); In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) aff’d in 
part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part sub nom., Arkansas Carpenters Health & 
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010); but see In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 
F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 261. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
561 n.6 (1992). 
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may appear just as consistent with the cognitive miser phenomenon.  
However upon closer inspection, the cognitive miser phenomenon 
does in fact predict the judiciary’s adverse response to the antitrust 
agencies’ proposals. 
First, although the quick-look test the FTC put forward in In re 
Androgel avoided a comprehensive rule of reason analysis, the test 
required an adjudication of the underlying patent claims as a threshold 
issue. Engaging in a trial-within-a-trial, even where the embedded 
trial does not reflect an adversarial proceeding between the parties 
who actually have adverse interests in its outcome, is not a new 
proposition; for example courts for years have done so in the context 
of malpractice claims against attorneys.
262
  Yet while resolution of the 
antitrust challenge would be fairly straightforward once the merits of 
the claims were analyzed,
263
 adjudicating a patent dispute as a 
threshold inquiry in an antitrust challenge is not particularly 
conducive to heuristic shortcuts, as discussed previously with respect 
to the DOJ’s initial rule of reason proposal.  Such a task would add 
significant patent-related technological engagement to antitrust suits. 
Indeed this aspect of the FTC’s objective quick-look test 
appeared to pose the biggest affront to the Eleventh Circuit in In re 
Androgel.  Some may interpret the court’s aversion as flowing simply 
from a general institutional concern over scarce resources.  The 
Supreme Court in Actavis openly speculated that “a general legal 
policy favoring the settlement of disputes” and an “underlying 
practical concern . . . that antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment 
agreement would require the parties to litigate the validity of the 
patent”—which would necessarily “prove time consuming, complex, 
and expensive”—were driving the sham litigation rule’s popularity.264  
The Court even chided the Eleventh Circuit for adopting a rule based 
on a single rationale, “the desirability of settlements.”265  Moving 
settled claims back into the spotlight of litigation undeniably imposes 
systemic costs on the courts as institutions, the parties as litigants, and 
 
 262. See, e.g., Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial Within a Trial—A 
Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 40, 41 
(1989). 
 263. It would be straightforward, at least, if the patent holder was found more likely than 
not to have lost the underlying suit.  In this case, the settlement would be illegal.  However, the 
FTC never elucidated the framework for analyzing whether a settlement was anticompetitive 
where the patent holder was likely to have won.  See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
165, 169 (Cal. App. 4th. 2011), review granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012). 
 264. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013). 
 265. Id. at 2237. 
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the public as taxpayers.  As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, the 
FTC’s test would erase most of the benefits of settlement, as parties 
would be forced to litigate the very claims they had sought to avoid 
litigating.
266
  Across a spectrum of legal areas, courts frequently cite a 
general public interest in settlement as a means of ending complex 
and expensive litigation.
267
  The Eleventh Circuit was likely sensitive 
to these traditional concerns when considering which test to adopt.  
Any mode of analysis requiring litigation of claims otherwise 
disposed of out of court imposes burdens the judiciary will be 
disinclined to accept, absent offsetting benefits.
268
 
This rationale ultimately falls short because the Eleventh Circuit 
moved beyond praising the traditional benefits of settlement, to also 
address concerns specific to the task of analyzing patents.  In closing, 
the court first emphasized its strong distaste for “attempt[ing] to 
decide how some other court in some other case at some other time 
was likely to have resolved some other claim if it had been pursued to 
judgment.”269  But the court then went on to explain how this 
undertaking was all the more inappropriate because it and its appellate 
colleagues outside the Federal Circuit were “ill-equipped to make a 
judgment about the merits of a patent infringement claim.”270  
Congress intended for “appeals involving patent issues” to be handled 
by the Federal Circuit alone, and the FTC’s approach would be “in 
tension” with this goal.271 
To a certain extent, this is a valid point.  While any district court 
can be called upon to analyze the merits of a patent infringement 
claim—bringing to bear no more expertise than the Eleventh 
Circuit—its decision is ultimately subject to review by the Federal 
Circuit.  In contrast, under the FTC’s test, a decision at least 
implicating the merits of a patent infringement suit could completely 
 
 266. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 267. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2010); Flex-
Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001); United States v. Glens Falls 
Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 268. Cf. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 
373 (2001) (arguing that civil litigation has evolved into transactional deals, largely driven by a 
“judicial branch [which] has a vested interest in transactions that create finality because they are 
thereby absolved of adjudicatory work”). 
 269. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1315. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id.  When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it granted the court exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals “from a final decision of a district court . . . relating to patents.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2011). 
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circumnavigate Federal Circuit scrutiny.
272
 
But the Eleventh Circuit appears to protest too much.  The 
Federal Circuit is not the sole arbiter of all “appeals involving patent 
issues.”  Instead, a more limited pool of claims, namely those “arising 
under” patent law, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit.
273
  Not all claims implicating patent questions “arise under” 
patent law.
274
  Patent law and antitrust have coexisted in cases both 
within the Federal Circuit
275
 and outside of it.
276
  Indeed, patent law 
has for years crept into cases outside of the Federal Circuit in a 
variety of contexts,
277
 and continues to do so with little suggestion 
that ex-Federal Circuit appellate courts should be stripped of their 
jurisdiction to hear them.  The Eleventh Circuit certainly made no 
attempt to argue it lacked jurisdiction over the case because the 
claims should be viewed as “arising under” patent law.  Instead, the 
court couched its comment within a discussion of its own lack of 
expertise.  In other words, if the court were to apply the FTC’s 
framework, the claims would still be properly before the court from a 
jurisdictional perspective, but in terms of institutional experience the 
task of adjudication would be better channeled through the more 
technologically-savvy Federal Circuit.
278
  In order to avoid a 
perceived mismatch between subject matter and expertise of the 
 
 272. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988) 
(explaining that a case raising patent law only as a defense does not fall within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and therefore is appealed to the regional circuit court of 
appeals). 
 273. See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. Dist. of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“This court has exclusive jurisdiction to review cases . . . ‘arising under’ the patent 
laws.”). 
 274. 8 CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02[1]. 
 275. For example under the affirmative defense of “patent misuse,” patent holders who 
“impermissibly broaden[] the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant,” generally through 
a violation of antitrust law, will be unable to enforce their patents against alleged infringers.  
See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326-31 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 276. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 
2009); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Our 
review of the patent courts’ opinions convinces us that Bell Atlantic’s case against Covad was 
not objectively baseless.”). 
 277. See, e.g., Wisc. Alumni Research Found. v. Xenon Pharm., Inc., 591 F.3d 876 (7th 
Cir. 2010); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Micro-Trak Sys., Inc., 186 F.3d 98 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 278. In a similar vein, some have suggested that reverse payment settlements be handled 
solely through the patent system, rather than using antitrust law and generalist courts.  See 
Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 
318-33 (2011) (arguing that a superior method of differentiating between pro- and 
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements would be to send the disputed patent through the 
Patent and Trademark Office’s patent reexamination proceedings). 
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adjudicator, the court rejected the FTC’s test in favor of the sham 
litigation rule.  Just as “Federal Circuit formalism creates hard-edged 
rules that reduce the weight and scope of technological inquiries,”279 
the sham litigation rule creates a framework that significantly reduces 
the necessity of inquiring into the patented technology that was the 
subject of the contested settlement. 
If courts are unconsciously receptive in this context to applying a 
rule in lieu of a holistic standard, and one that avoids mimicking a 
miniature patent trial, why stick with the sham litigation rule when the 
DOJ’s bright-line presumptively illegal rule also avoids any 
assessment of the patent dispute?  Two forces related to the cognitive 
miser phenomenon drove the judiciary’s preference for the sham 
litigation rule over a DOJ-type presumptively illegal rule.  First, a 
presumptively illegal rule is still much more information-demanding 
than the sham litigation rule.  Second, such a rule threatens adverse 
long-term consequences for courts, not merely in terms of fewer 
settlements in general but a greater influx of patent litigation. 
A presumptively illegal rule requires the defendants to bear the 
burden of proof to show the payment was not for delay.  The settling 
defendants start with an uphill battle because, as described above, this 
type of approach views the possibility of competition between the 
companies as a property right held by consumers.  In light of the 
foregoing discussion regarding exclusion rules and in rem rights, it is 
unsurprising that the DOJ selected a fairly bright-line rule to protect 
the consumers’ property right—hence the presumption that a 
conflicting ‘use’ of this property right by the settling companies will 
not be tolerated.  However, a presumptively illegal test flips the 
perspective of the entitlement holder.  Instead of protecting a patent 
holder’s property right, the test is concerned with protecting 
consumers’ property right in the possibility of competition.  The DOJ 
did blunt its exclusion rule by interposing elements of a governance 
regime and allowing a reverse payment settlement to survive in 
certain narrow situations.  Defendants could rebut a plaintiff’s prima 
facie case of anticompetitive effects (created whenever there is a 
settlement with a predetermined entry date and compensation flowing 
from the branded to the generic company), by showing that the 
settlement did not result in a level of competition significantly less 
than they expected to occur if the patent suit was litigated to a final 
 
 279. Lee, supra note 6, at 41. 
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judgment.
280
 
Interjecting a cost-benefit analysis as a backstop serves as a 
departure from the pure exclusion end of the exclusion-governance 
spectrum, but the move is entirely consistent with this theory of 
property rights.  As Professor Smith explains, elements of governance 
are often added to an exclusion regime as “a supplemental fine-
tuning” device when “the pressure on and value of resources rise.”281  
The FTC has estimated that delayed entry of a generic by even one 
year has a multi-million dollar impact on third-party payers and 
consumers.
282
  The DOJ evidently views drug policy as sufficiently 
complex, and the intellectual property at stake sufficiently valuable, 
to merit application of a test offering more flexibility than a pure 
exclusion rule could provide.  The generic companies in any given 
settlement may be in vastly different positions in terms of their own 
financial strength and the merits of their claimed right to market a 
generic product.  If the settling parties can show that the generic 
manufacturer would actually be unlikely to both win in court and 
have the capacity to timely become a vigorous competitor, the DOJ 
has in effect determined that consumers are better off if the settling 
companies are permitted to act in ways contrary to what it has defined 
as the consumers’ property right.283 
But the additional nuance from this supplemental governance 
regime comes, as always, with a price, and when courts evaluate the 
defendants’ rebuttal, they bear far higher information costs than when 
they apply the sham litigation rule.  As discussed above, if the amount 
of the payment is not roughly in line with the branded company’s 
saved litigation costs, the DOJ would require the defendants to prove 
that the settlement’s entry date truly reflected their evaluations of the 
likely outcome of the underlying litigation.  The DOJ acknowledged 
“precision is impossible” with respect to this counterfactual inquiry, 
but maintained that settling parties could successfully defend 
themselves by “providing a reasonable explanation” of other 
consideration received in exchange for the reverse payment.
284
  When 
the Third Circuit adopted a presumptively illegal rule in In re K-Dur, 
 
 280. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
28. 
 281. Nuisance, supra note 25, at 989. 
 282. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 2. 
 283. Cf. Nuisance, supra note 25, at 978-79. 
 284. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
31-32. 
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it described two ways for defendants to rebut the prima facie case.  
The first option was the DOJ’s inquiry into the value of other 
consideration the branded company had received in exchange for its 
payment; the second, “probably rare” option would allow a patent 
holder to show that the reverse payment settlement “offers a 
competitive benefit that could not have been achieved in the absence 
of a reverse payment,” such as where “a modest cash payment . . . 
enables a cash-starved generic manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and 
begin marketing a generic drug.”285 
As an initial matter, the premises of the Third Circuit’s test 
confirm that the second option will rarely be a realistic option for 
most defendants.  This rule begins with the presumption that the 
settlement erased some possibility of competition.  Accordingly, the 
defendants would have to show that this possibility of competition 
would not actually have come about and thus the settlement, with its 
pre-expiration entry date, would in fact lead to more competition than 
if the parties had not entered into the settlement.  One way of 
demonstrating that the possibility of competition was but a mirage 
would be to establish that the patent holder would have won in court.  
But because the Third Circuit refused to look at the merits of the 
underlying patent suit, the defendants would be relegated to showing 
that, even assuming the patent posed no obstacle, the generic 
company was not in a position to enter the market.  Realistically, only 
a narrow segment of settling defendants have such a relationship.  For 
all practical purposes, then, they would have had to pursue the first 
option. 
To succeed, the defendants would need to provide a thorough 
explanation of the technology at issue in order to facilitate a decision 
by the judge over the reasonableness of the consideration exchanged.  
Particularly in comparison with the sham litigation rule, this would 
entail considerable technological engagement.  The sham litigation 
rule, which does not offer a rebuttal phase, avoids this type of inquiry.  
Far less information is necessary for a judge to determine that the 
underlying infringement suit was not baseless, the settlement did not 
restrict sales of drugs not at issue in the patent litigation, and entry 
occurred prior to the expiration of the patent. 
There is a second facet to the explanation of how the cognitive 
miser phenomenon drove the vast majority of courts to select the 
sham litigation rule over the presumptively illegal rule.  The very 
 
 285. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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preference for a bright-line rule with a default that stems the long-
term flow of patent litigation is consistent with courts acting as meta-
cognitive misers.  Adopting a rule that facilitates reverse payment 
settlements means parties are more likely to settle potential future 
patent disputes, allowing judges to avoid altogether the technological 
engagement required by a patent infringement suit. 
A presumptively illegal rule threatens to siphon off patent 
disputes that would have been settled out of court and instead forces 
the judiciary to review these notoriously complex cases. 
Not only does the rule’s default bar settlement—in contrast to 
the sham litigation rule’s default, which upholds the settlement—but 
it is difficult to imagine a defendant overcoming the prima facie case.  
The cumulative effect is an ex ante decrease in the incentive to 
attempt to settle at all.
286
  Moreover, adopting a presumptively illegal 
rule could have spillover effects and inhibit a broader scope of patent-
related agreements.  The test implicitly presumes consumers have a 
property right in the possibility of competition prior to the expiration 
of the patent.  Once this concept establishes a toehold, ex-
pharmaceutical industry patent settlements or even licensing 
agreements between patent holders and potential competitors could be 
vulnerable to the chilling threat of an antitrust suit.
287
 
Applying the sham litigation rule does simultaneously address 
some of the more short-term concerns driving settlement in general, 
namely protecting the limited institutional resources of the courts (and 
indirectly, the public fiscally).  However, as this section will explain, 
reverse payment settlements are not the type of litigation that tends to 
be the subject of lighter judicial scrutiny.  The generalist judge’s often 
uncomfortable relationship with patent litigation provided the 
supplemental impetus to overcome the ardent objections from the 
antitrust agencies that broadly allowing all but the most egregious 
reverse payment settlements is injurious to the public. 
 
 286. See Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1049 (predicting that the “likely” result of courts 
applying a DOJ-type quick-look test based on probabilistic patent protection would be “far 
fewer settlements of patent litigations”). 
 287. See Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Settlements and Antitrust: on 
“Probabilistic” Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 72-73 (“If we 
define patents as having diminished ‘strength,’ why should protection of that alleged ‘consumer 
surplus’ be limited to settlements?  Consider licenses.  As Shapiro perceptively observes, 
‘[v]irtually every patent license can be viewed as a settlement of a patent dispute.’  When a 
patentee grants any license, therefore, should the government be scrutinizing the royalty rate to 
ensure that consumers face a price low enough to preserve their ‘property right’ in the 
possibility that the patent is invalid?”); see also FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2245 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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When appellate courts have adopted the sham litigation rule, 
they have generally been affirming a district court’s decision to apply 
the same approach.
288
  As the adjudicators on the front lines of patent 
litigation, district courts would have been particularly prone to 
selecting a framework of analysis not simply out of a general concern 
that settlement be encouraged, but as long-run cognitive misers 
seeking to stem the growing tide of patent claims.  District courts 
have been experiencing a marked increase in patent litigation.  In 
2007, plaintiffs commenced 2,896 patent cases, and by 2011 this 
figure had increased by nearly 40%.
289
  As district judge Patti Saris 
has noted, “Patent litigation is like the neurosurgery of litigation: it is 
hard scientifically and it is hard legally.”290  The Federal Circuit 
reverses district court patent decisions with relative frequency (as 
compared to the district court reversal rate in other areas of law), and 
Judge Saris further reflected that the “high reversal rate demoralizes 
many federal district court judges,” rendering district courts nothing 
but “a weigh station along the way to” having their appeal heard by 
the Federal Circuit.
291
  Given the combination of a technologically 
challenging area of law and a sense among at least some judges that it 
is also an area in which they achieve less success, a rule threatening to 
further inhibit settlement when patent cases are already on the rise 
would seem a ghastly specter. 
 
 288. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming approach 
of In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2010)); Arkansas 
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), as corrected (June 
17, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606, 179 L. Ed. 2d 517 (U.S. 2011) (affirming approach of 
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)); In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same); In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming approach of In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).  Before the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the sham litigation rule, both district courts faced with 
the choice chose the sham litigation rule.  See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 
702 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2010); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG), 
2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2009) report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652 
JAG, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010). 
 289. STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 130 (2011).  Before 2007, the numbers were fairly level, for example in FY 
2005 there were 2,720 patent cases filed in district court.  STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES 
PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl C-2 (2006).  In FY 2003 
there were 2,700 patent cases filed.  STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl C-2 (2004). 
 290. The Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley et. al., A Panel Discussion: Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 
(2004). 
 291. Id. 
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Although the appellate courts were not as directly affected as the 
district courts by an increase in patent litigation, they would still reap 
institutional benefits from a rule that, by making most reverse 
payment settlement challenges futile, keeps them out of court.  
Furthermore, the appellate courts were aware of, and seemed to 
sympathize with, the added patent caseload the district courts would 
face if forced to apply a rule of presumptive illegality.  The Second 
Circuit expressed concern that a rule “severely restricting patent 
settlements” would “forc[e] patent litigation to continue.”292  The 
Eleventh Circuit explained that a rule “foreclose[ing] a patentee’s 
ability to settle its infringement claim” would increase “[p]atent 
litigation[, which] breeds a litany of direct and indirect costs.”293  
Although appellate courts would not need to adjudicate the resulting 
jump in patent infringement suits both they and the district courts 
predicted would result from a rule of presumptive illegality, the 
appellate courts were palpably concerned with the consequences of 
such a rule. 
That judges may act in ways that create institutionally 
advantageous case management is not a new proposition,
294
 and in the 
recent era of austerity and budget cuts, the issue of how limited 
judicial resources affects the organization and output of the courts has 
received increased attention.
295
  Professor Bert Huang has 
documented an analogous phenomenon, triggered by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision in 2002 to initiate a concerted 
effort to clear out a backlog of deportation cases.
296
  Particularly 
because most of the BIA’s subsequent decisions involved upholding 
deportation orders, the federal courts of appeals faced a deluge of 
 
 292. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 293. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1074-75. 
 294. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of 
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 623-35 (1994) (arguing that judges are prone to using the 
rules of procedure in ways that will enable them to avoid presiding over cases which they do not 
wish to decide on the merits). 
 295. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention As A Scarce Resource: A Preliminary 
Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 401 (2013) (describing how courts institute case management practices such as 
staff attorney review and no argument submission so as to use limited judicial resources in a 
way that maximizes error correction and law development); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity 
and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422 (2012) (arguing that limited 
judicial capacity has influenced the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking in “high volume” and 
“high stakes” constitutional cases, by “creat[ing] strong pressure on the Court to embrace hard-
edged categorical rules, defer to the political process, or both”). 
 296. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1122 (2011). 
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petitions for review.
297
  The avalanche happened to be concentrated in 
the Second and Ninth Circuits and continued unabated for several 
years, thereby setting the stage for a natural experiment.  Huang 
compared the overall reversal rate of district court opinions in the 
Second and Ninth Circuits with the reversal rate in the other, 
relatively unaffected circuits.
298
  In the two circuits enduring a surge 
in BIA appeals, the rate at which district courts were reversed 
dropped significantly.
299
  Huang dubbed this phenomenon “lightened 
scrutiny”: because the influx of BIA appeals severely strained the 
resources of the Second and Ninth Circuits, these courts effectively 
chose to triage, shifting resources at the margins away from review of 
district court decisions and toward review of the BIA cases.
300
 
Selection of the sham litigation rule reflects a similar type of 
institutional decision to employ lightened scrutiny on reverse payment 
settlements.  First, this application of lightened scrutiny implicates 
concerns over limited capacity.  Patent cases are notoriously resource-
intensive,
301
 so much so that district courts have increasingly adopted 
local rules applicable only to patent litigation, with the goal of 
streamlining their resolution.
302
  Alongside the 40% increase in patent 
cases from 2007–11, there was also a 5.8% increase in total cases303 
and the average number of cases per judgeship rose from 380 to 
427.
304
  To the extent the rise in patent litigation has strained present 
and threatened future district court resources, it seems natural that it 
contributed to the subconscious decision to effectively apply 
lightened scrutiny to reverse payment settlement cases.  If the path to 
settlement is obstructed, courts may reasonably fear that they will not 
have the resources to deal with the resultant increase in patent 
litigation.  Applying the sham litigation rule mitigates the costliness 
of technological engagement in the long run, by allowing would-be 
 
 297. Id. at 1122-23.  BIA decisions are appealed directly to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the state in which the immigration judge who initially processed the foreign 
national is located.  Id. at 1123, 1125. 
 298. Id. at 1130-34. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 1137. 
 301. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
(2011). 
 302. JOESPHE E. CWIK, LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES 
(2012), available at 2012 WL 1670113. 
 303. STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 10 (2011). 
 304. Id. at 16. 
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patent litigants to pursue a broader range of settlement terms.
305
 
Using the sham litigation rule as a mechanism to apply lightened 
scrutiny may reflect not only a judicial concern with more patent 
litigation in the long term, but an intuition that more intensive 
adjudication of reverse payment settlement cases is an inefficient use 
of resources.  As Judge Saris’s comments allude to, many district 
courts may lack confidence they are getting it right when they analyze 
legal issues involving patents.  The sham litigation rule is consistent 
with triaging to shift resources to areas where they will have a greater 
marginal benefit—in other words to where courts are more 
comfortable they can accurately apply their legal acumen. 
This motivation also explains why the judiciary’s triage of 
resources away from reverse payment settlements otherwise seems to 
conflict with how courts otherwise tend to allocate their limited 
resources.  Professor Marin Levy analogously hypothesized that 
appellate courts seeking to maximize their “output” of “error 
correction and law development” would “seek out certain cases—
those that are complex and those that present novel issues of law” and 
apply relatively higher levels of judicial resources to these cases, 
while “certain kinds of cases—repeating appeals, patently frivolous 
appeals, and those that have received at least one meaningful review 
before reaching the appellate courts” would receive “less judicial 
attention.”306  Levy found that appellate court case management 
techniques were consistent with her predictions.
307
  For example, 
cases involving repeating issues such as sentencing appeals are very 
frequently decided on the briefs primarily by staff attorneys, while 
cases that were already reviewed prior to arriving on the district 
court’s docket, such as Social Security and BIA appeals, are also 
given no-argument status at very high rates.
308
  Implementing these 
types of institutional case management rules allow judges to 
maximize the “output” achieved with fairly fixed inputs by 
“spend[ing] less of their own attention”—arguably the most costly 
and limited judicial resource—”on cases that they thought could be 
 
 305. Defenders of reverse payment settlements argue that different positions in terms of 
risk aversion and information asymmetries can lead to situations where bargaining would be 
unlikely to lead to a mutually agreeable settlement if reverse payments were off the table.  See 
John P. Bigelow, Pharmaceutical Patents, Settlements, “Reverse Payments,” and Exclusion, 
CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 4-5 (June 2012). 
 306. Levy, supra note 295, at 435. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 436-38. 
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corrected without full judicial treatment.”309 
District courts, as much as the appellate courts Levy analyzed, 
would be incentivized to maximize the value of their legal output 
within the constraints of fixed resource inputs.  Levy’s work, then, 
predicts that antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, as 
“complex” cases involving “novel issues of law,” should receive “full 
judicial treatment.”310  Yet both district and appellate courts crafted a 
legal rule that insulates the vast majority of such cases from almost 
any judicial review.  The judiciary seems to have manifested a 
conviction that pouring resources into these cases would not 
maximize the value of their legal output. 
Shifting resources away from areas in which they feel relatively 
ill-equipped to adjudicate accurately is also a way of deferring to 
those with greater expertise: the parties themselves.  Such deference 
to authority is yet another typical expression of the cognitive miser 
phenomenon.
311
  Indeed, the assumption that the parties, rather than 
the courts, know best was a recurrent element of judicial approval of 
the sham litigation rule.  As the District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York explained, it is to be “expected that the market would 
correct for any bolstering of flagrantly invalid patents by way of 
exclusion payments.”312  If a branded manufacturer were able to slip 
through a settlement that effectively pays a generic to stay off the 
market, courts frequently explained that the economics of the 
situation predicts it would not be a long-term problem, particularly 
given Hatch-Waxman’s incentives for generics to file suit.313  Courts 
are aware that patents are a particularly effective promoter of 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry,
314
 and they may have 
believed that a judge’s decision about whether generic entry occurred 
“too late” under a settlement would simply end up being wrong more 
often than not, disturbing the balance of incentives to innovate.
315
  
 
 309. Id. at 431. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Lee, supra note 6, at 24. 
 312. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 535 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).  See also FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012); 
In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211-12.  In choosing the alternate course, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals explicitly disagreed that “subsequent challenges by other generic manufacturers will 
suffice to eliminate weak patents preserved through a reverse payment to the initial challenger.”  
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 313. See In re Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
 314. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 503, 507-15 (2009). 
 315. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. 
JENNY 4/2/2014  11:01 PM 
2014] INFO. COSTS & REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 293 
The parties themselves know more about the relevant technology and 
relative strength of the patent, and through private bargaining may 
reach a more accurate assessment of when, prior to patent expiration, 
generic entry is warranted.
316
 
Some might argue that selection of a default rule that upholds 
reverse payment settlements simply reflects the oft-noted preference 
in the antitrust context for Type II errors (wrongly allowing an 
anticompetitive agreement to stand) over Type I errors (wrongly 
condemning an agreement as anticompetitive).
317
  But this 
explanation fails to account for the dramatic nature of the split 
between the courts and the antitrust agencies.  Many commentators 
have noted that the antitrust agencies have also participated in the 
judiciary’s trend toward preferring Type II errors over Type I 
errors.
318
  But the antitrust agencies have become so convinced of the 
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment settlements that they have 
 
REV. 972, 977-78 (1986) (“[T]he rules must accommodate the judges’ limits, rather than the 
other way around.  In other fields, the inability of judges to decide what is efficient business 
conduct and what is not is a foundation for powerful rules compelling judges to keep their hands 
off—in corporate law this is known as the business judgment doctrine.  Why should antitrust 
law demand of judges and juries answers that other branches of the law know courts cannot 
supply?”). 
 316. Cf. Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 24-25, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) 
(“Often price is not the only important term in these deals and courts are woefully inadequate 
compared to the marketplace for determining and enforcing these other terms . . . [P]rivate 
ordering among parties can lead to textured contracts having many terms including price but 
also including a host of seemingly esoteric and unique provisions—such as technical support, 
field-of-use or territory limitations, grant-backs, cross-licenses, payment schedules, most-
favored-nation provisions, etc. . . .”); Nuisance, supra note 25, at 985 (“Given positive 
information costs, there is good reason to think that using the exclusion strategy often yields a 
better result than would combining governance rules and devices to minimize strategic behavior.  
Under governance rules, a court has to weigh the value of various uses . . . . Where courts have 
limited abilities to identify and evaluate the competing information about uses presented by 
parties . . . [they] can engage in strategic behavior that defeats the owner’s investment in the 
asset.”). 
 317. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 
113-15 (2010); see also Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: 
Competition For and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1413 (2003) 
(describing shift in antitrust law toward a preference for Type II errors, based on a perception 
that their cumulative effect is less costly to general welfare); Easterbrook, supra note 166, at 15-
17 (explaining that Type 1 errors are often more harmful than Type II errors because it is 
generally easier for the market to undercut and correct for monopolies than to correct for judicial 
errors). 
 318. See, e.g., William Bradford, The Creation and Destruction of Price Cartels: An 
Evolutionary Theory, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 285, 291 (2012); Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 317, 
at 79-83; Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: 
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 171-72 (2008) (discussing 
how institutional design of merger review incentives underenforcement by the FTC and DOJ). 
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selected a rule that openly acknowledges its preference for Type I 
errors.  Courts, nonetheless, have stayed the course.  The judiciary’s 
preference for committing a Type II error rather than a Type I error, 
despite the agencies’ implicit insistence that the invariably 
anticompetitive effect of these settlements overcomes any theoretical 
basis for preferring Type II errors, is a reflection of the cognitive 
miser phenomenon.  If courts feel particularly pessimistic about their 
accuracy in identifying the truly anticompetitive deals, the agencies’ 
vocal complaints about the especial harm these settlements pose 
would fall on deaf ears.  Courts would prefer to avoid expending 
significant resources by entangling themselves in the details of the 
dispute, and instead commit a Type II error and allow the market 
participants to straighten out the consequences. 
Prior to Actavis, courts consistently rejected the notion that the 
additional precision supplied by the DOJ’s rule would be worth the 
costs of attempting to develop for themselves the necessary 
information about the settlement.  The judiciary’s overwhelming 
preference for the sham litigation rule indicates that they do not 
believe the benefits created by the extra precision and over-deterrence 
of the DOJ rule outweigh the costs of the sham litigation rule’s under-
deterrence, and it is the cognitive miser phenomenon driving this 
calculus. 
V. ENDING THE IMPASSE 
With the courts generally refusing to apply the strict review 
called for by the antitrust agencies, both sides had become entrenched 
in diametrically opposed positions.  Congressional subcommittees 
entertained proposed legislative solutions to the disagreement, but no 
bill ever attained significant momentum,
319
 despite the FTC’s pleas to 
 
 319. Failed Senate proposals include Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 
112th Cong. (2011); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007); Preserve Access to 
Affordable Generics Act, S. 3582, 109th Cong. (2006).  Comparable bills have been introduced 
in the House, only to similarly stall in sub-committees.  See Protecting Consumer Access to 
Generic Drugs, H.R. 1706 (2009); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, H.R. 1432, 
110th Cong. (2007).  There have been several attempts to attach anti-reverse payment settlement 
provisions to other pieces of legislation—for example one such provision was added initially 
added to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  Jared A. Favole, Health Bill Drops 
Ban on Deals Between Brand-Generic-Drug Makers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2010 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704743404575128554066715036.  One 
senator even sought to add a ban on reverse payment settlements to the bill reauthorizing FDA 
user fees, but the suggested amendment was voted down by a wide margin.  U.S. Senate, U.S. 
Senate Roll Call Votes 112th Congress—2nd Session, On the Amendment (Bingaman Amdt. 
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Congress.
320
  For nearly a decade the Supreme Court, too, stayed 
above the fray by repeatedly declining to grant certiorari in a reverse 
payment settlement case.  The Court’s decision in Actavis ended the 
impasse, but it did not terminate the impact of the cognitive miser 
phenomenon on antitrust challenges to reverse payments settlements.  
This driving force behind the persistence of the intergovernmental 
stalemate will significantly impact how the lower courts choose to 
execute the open-ended mandate in Actavis. 
The Supreme Court rejected both the majority approach among 
the lower courts and the position of the antitrust agencies.  The FTC 
sought approval of the minority rule from the Third Circuit.
321
  The 
settling drug companies asked the Supreme Court to affirm the 
Eleventh Circuit and give its blessing to the sham litigation rule.  The 
dissenters would have done so, insisting that “the rights conferred by 
the patent . . . form[] the zone within which the patent holder may 
operate without facing antitrust liability.”322  The majority instead 
held that, as in most antitrust challenges, courts must apply the rule of 
reason.
323
  In effect, the Court settled on a compromise between the 
two warring factions. 
In taking such a middle ground, the Supreme Court acted very 
much in keeping with its recent patent law decisions.  As Professor 
Lee has observed, while the Federal Circuit has adopted a formalistic 
approach to patent litigation, the Supreme Court has been trending 
towards a “holistic” standard-based approach, requiring lower courts 
to “engage in multifactored examinations of inventions and their 
technological context.”324  Recently, and repeatedly, the Supreme 
Court has criticized the Federal Circuit for being too formalistic.
325
  In 
 
No. 2111). 
 320. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 6; Rosch, supra note 104; Jon 
Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Center for American Progress (June 
23, 2009). 
 321. Brief for the Petitioner at 41, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-
416), 2013 WL 267027. 
 322. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Lee, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
 325. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“Section 101 is a ‘dynamic 
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.’  A categorical rule denying 
patent protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate the 
purposes of the patent law.’” (citations omitted)); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
419 (2007) (“Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and 
when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness 
analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and 
motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content 
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turn, the Court has been accused of adopting broad, unwieldy 
standards, which it enjoys the luxury of rarely having to apply.
326
  By 
rejecting the proposals of the parties before it as unnecessarily rigid 
and instead mandating a more amorphous inquiry, the Court mirrored 
its recent patent infringement decisions. 
The Court left open “the structuring” of this rule of reason 
inquiry but observed that the likelihood of anticompetitive effects will 
depend on the payment’s “size, its scale in relation to the payer’s 
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other 
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any 
other convincing justification.”327  Despite listing several potential 
factors to consider, the opinion’s concluding paragraph observes that 
trial courts are free to exercise great discretion in structuring their 
analyses, so long as they avoid “the use of antitrust theories too 
abbreviated . . . [or] consideration of every possible fact or theory 
irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on [the antitrust 
analysis].”328  Simply warning lower courts against being too brief or 
too exhaustive confers upon them considerable unguided discretion.  
In particular, courts will have to answer four major questions as they 
decide how to proceed.  The first is the extent to which the strength of 
the patent holder’s infringement lawsuit can serve as a counterweight 
against factors otherwise indicating anticompetitive effects; or, vice 
versa, the extent to which a purportedly weak claim for infringement 
will be used as the signal of an anticompetitive settlement.  
Regardless of the answer to this question, courts must next determine 
what additional factors they will consider as part of their analyses.  
Third, one of these factors will undoubtedly be the size of the reverse 
payment, which the Court emphasized is a useful proxy for the 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects.  But it is less clear how courts 
should use size to ascertain accurately this likelihood.  Most would 
agree that the unique context of any given settlement demands a more 
nuanced inquiry beyond looking to the sheer magnitude of the 
payment.  Finally, courts must determine which settlements are not 
encompassed within the ruling in Actavis, in other words which 
settlements need not undergo a rule of reason analysis.  The cognitive 
 
of issued patents.”). 
 326. See Lee, supra note 6, at 63 (“[T]he Court is free to announce broad, policy-oriented 
standards without considering the difficulties of applying them in myriad technological contexts.  
In an economic sense, the Court’s preference for standards imposes an information-cost 
externality on district judges.”). 
 327. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 328. Id. at 2238. 
JENNY 4/2/2014  11:01 PM 
2014] INFO. COSTS & REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 297 
miser phenomenon sheds light on how the lower courts are likely to 
respond. 
As to the first question, courts will generally be loath to rely on 
any significant inquiry into the merits of the patent infringement suit.  
The Actavis majority confidently predicted that litigating the very 
patent dispute the parties had attempted to bypass would itself be a 
largely avoidable task.
329
  When the DOJ proposed a quick-look test, 
it shared the Court’s optimism regarding the “unlikely” need to use 
“mini-trials of patent validity . . . in determining whether competition 
was unreasonably restrained.”330  The dissent criticized this sentiment 
as wishful thinking, prophesizing that settling defendants will stay 
silent on this issue only if they are barred from bringing it up.
331
  
When adopting a presumptively illegal rule, even the Third Circuit 
agreed “there is no need to consider the merits of the underlying 
patent suit.”332  Despite adopting a radically different approach than 
the majority of the lower courts, the Third Circuit’s refusal to 
incorporate the merits of the underlying patent infringement suit into 
its inquiry was notably consistent with the sham litigation rule.  
Litigating the patent dispute as a threshold inquiry to an antitrust suit 
is simply a task any cognitive miser would prefer to avoid, and in fact 
is one nearly every court thus far has avoided.  As courts move 
forward, they will likely take the Supreme Court up on its offer and 
generally find it “normally not necessary to litigate patent validity.”333  
Regardless of how accurate this factor is as a proxy for 
anticompetitive effects, courts are unlikely to accord it a central role 
in their rule of reason analyses. 
In its place, courts will turn to factors they can ascertain more 
reliably and at lower cost.  Lee has argued that the high information 
costs often attendant to multi-factor balancing tests can be mitigated if 
the Supreme Court provides lower courts with guideposts more 
 
 329. Id.  The majority may have recognized that focusing on the strength of the patent 
holder’s infringement lawsuit undercuts a purported rule of reason approach, by de facto 
imposing a per se bar on reverse payment settlements.  This is so because there would be little 
incentive for parties to ever enter into a reverse payment settlement if they knew they would 
almost inevitably have to litigate the infringement suit anyway as part of an antitrust challenge.  
See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 115 & n.295. 
 330. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 
31 n.13. 
 331. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013). 
 332. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 333. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013). 
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clearly structuring its expected inquiry.
334
  For example, the Court 
could delineate a relatively constrained set of weighted factors for 
courts to analyze.
335
  Although Actavis did not curb lower courts’ 
potential information costs in this manner, courts can engage in some 
self-help.  Providing clear and consistent indications of the factors 
they will analyze under the rule of reason acts as a roadmap for each 
court’s subsequent decisions.  It also serves to signal to the litigating 
parties the type of factors they should focus upon, which narrows the 
scope of the arguments presented to the court.  There will also be an 
added institutional benefit of easing some of the uncertainty potential 
litigants may feel, thereby encouraging pharmaceutical companies to 
still enter into settlements. 
In addition to remaining predictable, the factors will likely be 
objectively quantifiable indicia relating to the context of the 
settlement.  Well before the Actavis decision, Professors Butler and 
Jarosch argued in favor of a rule of reason approach and offered up a 
set of six factors targeting “the context and characteristics of the 
[reverse payment] settlement.”336  Butler and Jarosch acknowledged 
the significant information costs imposed by a rule of reason test.
337
  
However, they were confident their proposal could at least streamline 
the analysis by channeling a court’s attention to the most significant 
indicators of the settlement’s potential anticompetitive effects, and all 
without litigating the patent dispute.
338
  The type of factors Butler and 
Jarosch suggest, such as the difference in time between the 
settlement’s entry date and the patent’s expiration date, whether the 
patent holder has market power, and the financial health of the 
generic company,
339
 are a good institutional fit for district courts 
because they more closely mirror the type of fact-finding these courts 
have experience in performing.  Courts remain in familiar territory 
and minimize the cognitive burdens of applying rule of reason. 
Size of the payment is also one of the factors Butler and Jarosch 
argue should be examined.
340
  But they eschew strict numerical 
 
 334. Lee, supra note 6, at 66-68. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 115-19 (explaining that courts should consider “1) 
Market power; 2) The entrance date allowed by the reverse-payment settlement; 3) The relative 
size of the reverse payment; 4) The ANDA filer’s ability to market the drug without a reverse 
payment; 5) Sham litigation; and 6) Suspect side deals”). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 115. 
 339. See id. at 115-19. 
 340. Id. 
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thresholds for when a reverse payment will be deemed 
anticompetitive and instead assert that courts should evaluate the size 
of the payment relative to the value of the patent and the litigation 
costs parties likely would have incurred.
341
  As with the other factors 
suggested by Butler and Jarosch, this type of inquiry requires courts 
to compare a characteristic of the settlement with objectively 
quantifiable factors, which courts can ascertain at relatively minimal 
cost because they are accustomed to engaging in this type of fact-
finding.  Furthermore, by announcing the metrics against which the 
size of a reverse payment will be measured, courts allow parties, 
during the course of settlement negotiations, to calculate when a 
payment risks becoming so large that courts would view it as raising a 
red flag.  By broadcasting a range of payments that they will 
generally consider to be low risk, courts allow parties to react 
accordingly when structuring a settlement.  As a result, the antitrust 
agencies would be less likely to view bringing a challenge to court as 
an efficient use of agency resources.
342
 
Finally, courts will probably tend to narrow the breadth of 
Actavis’s application, cabining its relevance to settlements involving a 
flow of cash, rather than other forms of compensation, from the 
brand-name to the generic company.  The Court’s opinion leaves 
ambiguity as to the spectrum of settlements now subject to rule of 
reason antitrust scrutiny.  So far, every challenged reverse payment 
settlement has involved a cash payment from the brand-name 
company.  And while the FTC’s brief to the Supreme Court in Actavis 
was most skeptical of the “extraordinary and distinguishing feature of 
reverse-payment agreements . . . a substantial cash payment from the 
brand-name manufacturer that holds a patent,” in a footnote the FTC 
pondered “what other consideration would similarly justify a ‘quick 
look’ analysis,” besides “direct payments of money.”343  The Court 
expressed concern over “payment in return for staying out of the 
market” but neither limited the form of the payment to cash nor even 
 
 341. Id. at 117. 
 342. See generally James Langenfeld & Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of U.S. Federal 
Antitrust Enforcement: Learning From Past and Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 1 
(2007) (discussing factors that influence federal antitrust enforcement trends); Cf. WILLIAM E. 
KOVACIC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND 
CENTURY THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER PRACTICES 59 (2009) (describing how the 
FTC’s ability to achieve its mission of protecting consumers depends on efficient allocation of 
agency resources). 
 343. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 321, at 30, 36 n.7. 
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defined the term “reverse payment settlement.”344  Indeed, as the 
dissent points out, the Court’s rationale for applying rule of reason 
antitrust scrutiny to the settlement before it extends equally to other 
forms of consideration flowing from a brand-name to a generic 
company.
345
  This is so because whatever the form of compensation 
the patent holder transfers to a generic company, the patent holder 
could still be using “its monopoly profits to avoid the risk” of losing 
its patent through litigation.
346
  Third-party payers or the FTC may 
seek to challenge settlements with non-cash consideration as subject 
to a rule of reason analysis under Actavis.  Courts will have a decision 
to make regarding whether they are free, consistent with Actavis, to 
apply the sham litigation rule to such settlements.  The Third Circuit 
already has district courts in disagreement on this question.
347
 
For the same reason the courts favored the sham litigation rule in 
the first place, they will be disinclined to expand rule of reason 
scrutiny to settlements only arguably falling within the purview of 
Actavis.  By narrowing the scope of the holding in Actavis, courts can 
stake out a pool of settlements still viable under the sham litigation 
rule.  In a decision the day before the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Actavis, a district court acted analogously to constrain the 
Third Circuit’s ruling in In re K-Dur.348  The district court concluded 
that the Third Circuit had used the term “reverse payment” to mean 
“cash payment,” not other forms of consideration.349  Because the 
settlement at issue involved only non-cash consideration from a 
brand-name company to a generic, the district court ruled that the 
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act.
350
  In 
effect, the district court created a new bright-line rule to constrain 
application of the presumptively illegal rule and avoid having to strike 
down a settlement that terminated a patent infringement suit.  Courts 
confronted with construing Actavis’s rule of reason mandate will also 
 
 344. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013). 
 345. Id. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 346. Id. at 2232. 
 347. Compare In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-cv-2389 (PGS), 2013 WL 4780496 
(D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (denying drug companies’ motion to dismiss and rejecting contention that 
Actavis did not apply because the settlement did not involve a monetary payment) with In re 
Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-cv-995 (WHW), 2012 WL 6725580, at *6-7 
(D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012) (holding that Actavis applies only to settlements involving monetary 
payments). 
 348. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-cv-995 (WHW), 2012 WL 
6725580, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 7. 
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similarly tend to create bright-line rules with the consequence of 
narrowing the case’s applicability and allowing courts to continue to 
utilize the sham litigation rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Almost uniformly, the lower courts persisted in granting reverse 
payment settlements a broad safe harbor from antitrust scrutiny.  Like 
the courts, the antitrust agencies also selected a bright-line rule, but 
the agencies would have erred on the side of over-deterrence, striking 
down a reverse payment settlement unless the defendants could 
overcome a presumption of illegality.  Courts often endorse 
settlement as a desirable alternative to fully litigating a dispute.  Yet 
the reverse payment settlement context has been unusual because the 
courts have done so in the face of the antitrust agencies’ vehement 
insistence that settlement here will almost always entail costs to 
consumers—through higher drug prices—that outweigh any savings 
from curtailed litigation.  The consistent ease with which courts have 
overcome this friction implies propulsion by additional motivation.  
The tendency of courts to apply bright-line rules as information-cost-
saving devices when dealing with both property rights and complex 
patent and patent-related cases explains their decade-long divergence 
from the antitrust agencies.  Additionally, by giving reverse payment 
settlements less scrutiny, courts hoped to facilitate patent settlements, 
thereby allowing them to apply their institutional resources to cases 
they were more confident they could accurately adjudicate.  Although 
the Supreme Court ultimately ended the intergovernmental stalemate 
by requiring courts to analyze reverse payment settlements under a 
rule of reason approach, the cognitive miser phenomenon will remain 
relevant in this area of law.  Under Actavis, courts have considerable 
discretion in presiding over antitrust challenges to reverse payment 
settlements.  By considering how courts are susceptible to acting as 
cognitive misers, parties can more accurately tailor their arguments to 
those the court will tend to find persuasive. 
